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‘Denial	of	Benefits’	Clause	in	Investment	Treaty	Arbitration	
Professor	Loukas	Mistelis	and	Dr	Crina	Baltag	
	
	
A.	Introduction	
	
	
1 ‘Denial	of	benefits’	clauses,	while	having	gained	substantial	popularity	in	the	past	ten	
prolific	 years	 of	 Investor-State	 Dispute	 Settlement	 (‘ISDS’),	 are	 not	 a	 common	 or	
typical	presence	in	most	traditional	International	Investment	Agreements	(‘IIAs’),	be	
it	 in	the	form	of	Bilateral	Investment	Treaties	(‘BITs’)	or	 in	the	form	of	Free	Trade	
Agreements	 (‘FTAs’).	 UNCTAD’s	 Investment	 Policy	Hub	 lists	 215	 IIAs	 containing	 a	
‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	out	of	a	total	number	of	2,572	mapped	IIAs.	(United	Nations	
Conference	on	Trade	and	Development,	Investment	Policy	Hub)	
	
2 This	paper	analyses	the	framework	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	and	its	application	
by	tribunals	with	respect	to	the	procedural	requirements	of	the	clause	(jurisdiction,	
time	and	effect).		It	appears	that	there	are	two	distinct	lines	of	jurisprudence	on	the	
procedural	requirements	of	 ’denial	of	benefits’	clauses:	tribunals	constituted	under	
the	Energy	Charter	Treaty	(‘ECT’)	and	tribunals	constituted	under	US	BITs	and	the	
Dominican	Republic-Central	America	FTA	(CAFTA-DR).	
	
3 The	 purpose	 of	 the	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause	 is	 to	 exclude	 from	 the	 protection	
afforded	by	applicable	 IIA	 investors	 and	 their	 investments	who,	 although	 formally	
satisfying	the	definition	of	investor,	do	not	have	a	real	(economic)	connection	with	
the	 home	 State	 (→	 International	 investment	 arbitration;	 →	 Nationality	 of	 claim:	
Investment	 arbitration).	 In	Caratube	 v.	 Kazakhstan,	 the	 arbitral	 tribunal	 explained	
that	
	
This [denial of benefits] provision allows each of the parties to deny the benefits of the BIT’s 
protection to a company that is controlled by nationals of a third State and does not have 
any substantial activities in the other State-party to the BIT (Caratube v. Kazakhstan, 2012 
para 354).  
	
4 Dolzer	and	Schreuer	consider	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	as	a	‘method	to	counteract	
strategies	 that	 seek	 the	 protection	 of	 particular	 treaties	 by	 acquiring	 a	 favourable	
nationality’	 (Dolzer	 and	 Schreuer,	 55).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Salacuse	 explains	 that	
allowing	the	benefits	of	the	IIA	to	nationals	of	third	countries	or	to	those	’primarily	
associated’	 with	 those	 countries	 and	 with	 which	 the	 denying	 country	 has	 no	
relationship,	would	be	 to	abandon	 the	 ’right	 to	negotiate	 corresponding	privileges	
and	obligations	from	those	countries’	(Salacuse,	655).	As	such,	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	
clause	is	not	only	a	guarantee	against	the	abuse	of	rights,	but	also	a	’safety	measure	
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for	 safeguarding	 the	 principle	 of	 reciprocity	 embodied	 in	 investment	 treaties’	
(Mistelis	and	Baltag,	2009,	1303;	Sinclair,	1994,	3).	
5 The	arbitral	tribunal	in	Amto	v.	Ukraine	referred	to	the	scope	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	
clause	in	the	context	of	Article	17	of	the	Energy	Charter	Treaty	(‘ECT’):	
	
Article	17	can	be	read	together	with	the	definition	of	 'Investor'	 in	Article	1(7)	as	
establishing	two	classes	of	Investors	of	a	Contracting	Party	for	the	purposes	of	the	
ЕСТ.	The	 first	class	comprises	 Investors	with	an	 indefeasible	right	 to	 investment	
protection	under	the	ЕСТ.	This	class	includes	nationals	of	another	Contracting	Party	
–	whether	natural	persons	or	juridical	entities	–	except	for	those	nationals	falling	
within	the	second	class.	The	second	class	comprises	Investors	that	have	a	defeasible	
right	 to	 investment	 protection	 under	 the	 ЕСТ,	 because	 the	 host	 State	 of	 the	
investment	has	the	power	to	divest	the	Investor	of	this	right.	In	this	second	class	are	
legal	entities	that	satisfy	the	nationality	requirement	by	reason	of	incorporation	but	
are	 owned	 or	 controlled	 by	 nationals	 of	 a	 third	 state	 in	 a	 manner	 potentially	
unacceptable	 to	 the	 host	 State.	 Such	 foreign	 ownership	 or	 control	 is	 potentially	
unacceptable	where	it	involves	a	State	with	which	the	Host	State	does	not	maintain	
normal	diplomatic	or	economic	relationships,	or	where	 it	 is	not	accompanied	by	
substantial	business	activity	in	the	state	of	incorporation.	As	the	purpose	of	the	ЕСТ	
is	to	establish	a	legal	framework	'in	order	to	promote	long-term	cooperation	in	the	
energy	field,	based	on	complementarities	and	mutual	benefits...'	then	the	potential	
exclusion	of	foreign	owned	entities	from	ЕСТ	investment	protection	under	Article	
17	 is	 readily	 comprehensible.	 'Long	 term	 economic	 cooperation',	
'complementarities'	 or	 'mutual	 benefits'	 are	 unlikely	 to	materialise	 for	 the	 host	
State	with	a	State	that	serves	as	a	nationality	of	convenience	devoid	of	economic	
substance	for	an	investment	vehicle,	or	a	State	with	which	it	does	not	enjoy	normal	
diplomatic	or	economic	relations	(Amto	v.	Ukraine,	2008	para	61).	
	
6 Some	authors	consider	the	mechanism	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	to	operate	in	
a	 similar	 manner	 as	 to	 the	 limitations	 placed	 on	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 notion	 of	
‘investor’	(Lee,	2015,	366).	However,	the	effects	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	can	
differ	significantly.	For	example,	while	the	limitations	placed	on	the	definition	of	the	
notion	of	‘investor’	will	affect	the	jurisdiction	ratione	personae	of	arbitral	tribunals,	
the	 effects	 of	 the	 application	 of	 the	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause	 will	 depend	 on	 the	
wording	of	the	clause	and	of	the	locus	of	the	provision	in	the	structure	of	the	relevant	
IIA,	thus	affecting	the	jurisdiction	of	the	tribunal	or	the	merits	(admissibility)	of	the	
claim,	as	will	be	discussed	below.	
	
7 As	a	practical	issue,	the	invocation	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	is	a	matter	for	the	
host	State,	the	respondent	in	the	arbitration	proceedings,	to	raise	as	will	be	further	
detailed	below.	From	the	perspective	of	the	State,	authors	argue	that	the	 ‘denial	of	
benefits’	 clause	 is	 to	 be	 preferred	 to	 the	 doctrine	 of	 abuse	 of	 right,	 although,	 in	
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essence,	both	converge	to	the	same	result,	grounded	in	similar	motives	(→	Abuse	of	
process	in	international	arbitration).	As	explained,		
	
When available, a denial of benefits provision, rather than the principle of abuse of right, 
should be a respondent’s first choice when facing a claim brought by a company that 
appears to lack any genuine connection to its purported home State. There are several 
reasons to prefer a defence based on a denial of benefits provision. First, the abuse of right 
principle is not grounded in treaty text … Third, denial of benefits provisions reflect the 
express and shared views of the parties to the treaty regarding the circumstances in which 
treaty benefits can be denied … (Feldman, 2012, 283). 
	
8 In	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause	 relied	 on	 by	 respondent,	 arbitral	
tribunals	are	generally	reluctant	to	investigate	the	corporate	structure	of	 investors	
and	 their	 economic	 activities	 in	 the	 alleged	 home	 State.	 To	 the	 contrary,	 arbitral	
tribunals	 prefer	 to	 give	 full	 effect	 to	 the	 wording	 of	 the	 applicable	 IIA,	 and,	 in	
particular,	to	the	definition	of	the	notion	of	‘investor’	put	forward	therein.	As	pointed	
out	by	the	tribunal	in	Charanne	v.	Spain,		
	
On a more general level, the Arbitral Tribunal shares the position taken under the ECT by the 
tribunal in the Yukos case, according to which ’the Tribunal knows of no general principles of 
international law that would require investigating the structure of a company or another 
organization when the applicable treaty simply requires it to be organized in accordance 
with the laws of a Contracting Party’ (Charanne v. Spain, 2016, para 417). 
	
9 A	similar	position	was	adopted	by	other	arbitral	 tribunals.	For	example,	 in	Garanti	
Koza	v.	Turkmenistan,	the	tribunal	clarified	that	
	
…	the	BIT	requires	only	that	Garanti	Koza	be	incorporated	somewhere	in	the	United	
Kingdom	in	order	to	bring	its	investments	within	the	protection	of	the	treaty.	The	
BIT	 contains	no	denial-of-benefits	 clause	 that	would	 require	 that	 a	U.K.	 investor	
have	 actual	 operations	 in	 the	 U.K.	 And	 the	 weight	 of	 the	 evidence	 shows	 that	
Turkmenistan	 knew	 and	 accepted	 that	 it	 was	 dealing	with	 an	 English	 company	
(Garanti	Koza	v.	Turkmenistan,	2016,	para	222).	
	
10 In	 Tokios	 Tokelés	 v.	 Ukraine,	 the	 arbitral	 tribunal	 also	 took	 the	 view	 that,	 in	 the	
absence	of	a	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause,	the	tribunal	cannot	impose	any	limitation	on	
the	notion	of	 ‘investor’	 outside	 the	definition	of	 this	 term	 in	 the	applicable	 IIA.	As	
explained	by	the	tribunal,	
	
The	Ukraine-Lithuania	BIT	[applicable	 in	the	case],	by	contrast,	 includes	no	such	
’denial	of	benefits’	provision	with	 respect	 to	entities	 controlled	by	 third-country	
nationals	or	by	nationals	of	 the	denying	party.	We	 regard	 the	 absence	of	 such	a	
provision	as	a	deliberate	choice	of	the	Contracting	Parties.	In	our	view,	it	is	not	for	
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tribunals	to	impose	limits	on	the	scope	of	BITs	not	found	in	the	text,	much	less	limits	
nowhere	evident	from	the	negotiating	history.	An	international	tribunal	of	defined	
jurisdiction	should	not	reach	out	to	exercise	a	jurisdiction	beyond	the	borders	of	
the	definition.	But	equally	an	international	tribunal	should	exercise,	and	indeed	is	
bound	 to	 exercise,	 the	measure	of	 jurisdiction	with	which	 it	 is	 endowed	 (Tokios	
Tokelés	v.	Ukraine,	2004	para	36).	
	
11 ‘Denial	of	benefits’	clauses	have	received	more	attention	in	the	last	decade	as	a	means	
of	 countering	 aggressive	 or	 merely	 tactical	 (IIA)	 treaty	 shopping	 by	 way	 of	
incorporation	 of	 convenience	 (→	 Forum	 shopping:	 Investment	 arbitration).	
Consequently,	they	are	part	of	the	broader	policy	debate	for	reform	of	ISDS	and	IIAs	
(UNCTAD/WIR/2016,123).	The	discussions	in	the	sessions	of	the	UNCITRAL	Working	
Group	 III,	 addressing	 the	 ISDS	 reform,	 alluded	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 treaty	 shopping,	
although	not	retaining	 it	as	a	concern	per	 se,	with	suggestions	 that	 treaties	should	
include	proper	mechanisms	for	addressing	it.	(UNCITRAL,	A/CN.9/964)	
	
	
B	 The	 Framework	 of	 the	 ‘Denial	 of	 Benefits’	 Clause	 in	 International	 Investment	
Agreements	
	
12 As	mentioned	above,	it	is	not	common	that	IIAs	include	a	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	in	
their	provisions.	Originally	used	to	deny	diplomatic	protection,	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	
clause	 was	 later	 imported	 into	 the	 treaties	 concerning	 protection	 of	 foreign	
investments.	Traditionally,	the	US,	Canada,	China	and	Australia,	in	their	BITs	or	FTAs	
have	inserted,	even	from	the	early	generations	of	IIAs,	provisions	denying	the	benefits	
of	 the	 treaty	 to	 investors	and	 their	 investments,	under	specific	 conditions,	with	or	
without	prior	consultation.	The	origin	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	can	be	traced	
back	to	the	Treaties	of	Friendship,	Commerce	and	Navigation	(‘FCNs’),	in	which	the	
contracting	States	reserve	the	right	to	deny		
	
any	 of	 the	 rights	 and	 privileges	 accorded	 by	 this	 Treaty	 to	 any	 corporation	 or	
association	created	or	organized	under	the	laws	and	regulations	of	the	other	High	
Contracting	 Party	 which	 is	 directly	 or	 indirectly	 owned	 or	 controlled,	 through	
majority	stock	ownership	or	otherwise,	by	nationals,	corporations	or	associations	
of	any	third	country	or	countries	(United	States-China	FCN).	
	
13 Walker	Jr.	described	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	as	’a	latent	protective	clause	which	
a	party	may	utilize	 if	 it	wishes	 to	 take	 the	 initiative	 of	 so	doing.’(Walker	 Jr.,	 388).	
Interestingly,	 the	 same	author	 suggests	 that	 the	 ‘denial	 of	benefits’	 clause	 in	FCNs	
were	’directed	primarily	at	the	exercise	by	a	company	of	its	‘functional’	rather	than	its	
‘civil’	capacity.’	(Walker	Jr.,	388)	As	such,	the	denial	of	the	benefits	of	the	treaty	would	
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not	trigger	the	denial	of	nationality	or	of	the	existence	of	the	respective	entity,	nor,	as	
mentioned	in	some	FCNs,	the	denial	of	the	access	of	these	entities	to	the	local	courts.	
	
14 Later	on,	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	was	included	in	the	modern	IIAs.	For	example,	
Article	 I(b)	 of	 US-Democratic	 Republic	 of	 the	 Congo	BIT,	 entered	 into	 force	 1989,	
referred,	in	broad	terms,	to	the	following	‘denial	of	benefits’	provision:	
	
Each	Party	reserves	the	right	to	deny	to	any	of	its	own	companies	or	to	a	company	
of	the	other	Party	the	advantages	of	this	Treaty,	except	with	respect	to	recognition	
of	juridical	status	and	access	to	courts,	if	nationals	of	any	third	country	control	such	
company,	 provided	 that	whenever	 one	 Party	 concludes	 that	 the	 benefits	 of	 this	
Treaty	should	not	be	extended	to	a	company	of	the	other	Party	for	this	reason,	it	
shall	 promptly	 consult	 with	 the	 other	 Party	 to	 seek	 a	 mutually	 satisfactory	
resolution	to	this	matter.		
	
15 The	substantive	requirement	under	this	provision,	thus	considered	only	the	control	
of	 the	 investor	 legal	 entity	 by	 nationals	 of	 a	 third	 country.	 The	 US-Democratic	
Republic	of	the	Congo	BIT	also	required	the	prompt	consultation	between	the	parties	
to	the	BIT	for	‘a	mutually	satisfactory	resolution	to	this	matter.’	
	
16 Similarly,	Article	2(2)	of	Australia-Czech	Republic	BIT,	entered	into	force	on	29	June	
1994,	provides	that,		
[w]here	a	company	of	a	Contracting	Party	is	owned	or	controlled	by	a	citizen	or	a	
company	 of	 any	 third	 country,	 the	 Contracting	 Parties	 may	 decide	 jointly	 in	
consultation	 not	 to	 extend	 the	 rights	 and	 benefits	 of	 this	 Agreement	 to	 such	
company.		
	
17 Article	1113	of	 the	North	American	Free	Trade	Agreement	(‘NAFTA’),	entered	 into	
force	on	1	January	1994,	refers	to	the	following	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause:	
	
1.	A	Party	may	deny	the	benefits	of	this	Chapter	to	an	investor	of	another	Party	that	
is	an	enterprise	of	such	Party	and	to	investments	of	such	investor	if	investors	of	a	
non-Party	own	or	control	the	enterprise	and	the	denying	Party:	
(a)	does	not	maintain	diplomatic	relations	with	the	non-Party;	or	
(b)	adopts	or	maintains	measures	with	 respect	 to	 the	non-Party	 that	prohibit	
transactions	with	the	enterprise	or	that	would	be	violated	or	circumvented	if	the	
benefits	of	this	Chapter	were	accorded	to	the	enterprise	or	to	its	investments.	
2.	Subject	to	prior	notification	and	consultation	in	accordance	with	Articles	1803	
(Notification	and	Provision	of	Information)	and	2006	(Consultations),	a	Party	may	
deny	the	benefits	of	this	Chapter	to	an	investor	of	another	Party	that	is	an	enterprise	
of	such	Party	and	to	investments	of	such	investors	if	investors	of	a	non-Party	own	
or	control	the	enterprise	and	the	enterprise	has	no	substantial	business	activities	in	
the	territory	of	the	Party	under	whose	law	it	is	constituted	or	organized.	
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18 Under	the	second	limb	of	Article	1113	of	NAFTA,	a	party	may	deny	the	benefits	of	the	
treaty	 if	 investors	 of	 a	 non-NAFTA	 party	 control	 the	 investor-enterprise	 and	 the	
enterprise	has	no	substantial	business	activities	 in	the	territory	of	 the	Party	under	
whose	law	it	is	constituted	or	organized.	Such	provision	is	subject	to	prior	notification	
and	consultation	requirements	under	NAFTA.	
	
19 Article	14.14	of	the	United	States-Mexico-Canada	Agreement,	set	to	replace	NAFTA	in	
the	near	future,	also	includes	provisions	concerning	the	denial	of	benefits,	as	follows:	
	
1.	A	Party	may	deny	the	benefits	of	this	Chapter	to	an	investor	of	another	Party	that	
is	 an	 enterprise	 of	 that	 other	 Party	 and	 to	 investments	 of	 that	 investor	 if	 the	
enterprise:		
(a)	is	owned	or	controlled	by	a	person	of	a	non-Party	or	of	the	denying	Party;	and		
(b)	has	no	substantial	business	activities	in	the	territory	of	any	Party	other	than	
the	denying	Party.	
2.	A	Party	may	deny	the	benefits	of	this	Chapter	to	an	investor	of	another	Party	that	
is	an	enterprise	of	that	other	Party	and	to	investments	of	that	investor	if	persons	of	
a	 non-Party	 own	 or	 control	 the	 enterprise	 and	 the	 denying	 Party	 adopts	 or	
maintains	measures	with	respect	to	the	non-Party	or	a	person	of	the	non-Party	that	
prohibit	transactions	with	the	enterprise	or	that	would	be	violated	or	circumvented	
if	the	benefits	of	this	Chapter	were	accorded	to	the	enterprise	or	to	its	investments.	
	
20 It	appears	that	there	is	no	substantive	departure	from	the	wording	of	Article	1113	of	
NAFTA	in	the	new	United	States-Mexico-Canada	Agreement.	However,	unlike	NAFTA,	
the	 new	Agreement	 extends	 the	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause	 to	 instances	where	 the	
putative	investor	is	owned	or	controlled	not	only	by	persons	of	a	non-Party,	but	also	
by	 persons	 of	 the	 denying	 Party.	 Similar	 provisions	 may	 be	 found	 in	 other	 new	
generation	IIAs.	See,	for	example,	Art.	17(2)	of	the	US-Uruguay	BIT,	entered	into	force	
on	31	October	2006:	
A	Party	may	deny	the	benefits	of	this	Treaty	to	an	investor	of	the	other	Party	that	is	
an	 enterprise	 of	 such	 other	 Party	 and	 to	 investments	 of	 that	 investor	 if	 the	
enterprise	has	no	substantial	business	activities	in	the	territory	of	the	other	Party	
and	persons	of	a	non-Party,	or	of	the	denying	Party,	own	or	control	the	enterprise.	
	
21 Article	I(2)	of	Ukraine-US	BIT,	entered	into	force	on	16	November	1996,	contains	a	
provision	similar	 to	 the	one	 included	 in	NAFTA,	albeit	placed	 in	 the	context	of	 the	
definitions	of	the	notions	employed	by	the	BIT:	
	
Each	party	reserves	the	right	to	deny	to	any	company	the	advantages	of	this	Treaty	
if	nationals	of	any	third	country	control	such	company	and,	in	the	case	of	a	company	
of	 the	 other	 Party,	 that	 company	 has	 no	 substantial	 business	 activities	 in	 the	
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territory	of	 the	other	Party	 or	 is	 controlled	by	nationals	 of	 a	 third	 country	with	
which	the	denying	Party	does	not	maintain	normal	economic	relations.	
	
22 Article	17,	’Non-Application	of	Part	III	in	Certain	Circumstances’	of	the	Energy	Charter	
Treaty,	 in	 force	 in	 April	 1998,	 has	 been	 subject	 to	 extensive	 analysis	 by	 arbitral	
tribunals	and	it	refers	to	the	following:	
	
Each	Contracting	Party	reserves	the	right	to	deny	the	advantages	of	this	Part	to:	
(1)	a	legal	entity	if	citizens	or	nationals	of	a	third	state	own	or	control	such	entity	
and	if	that	entity	has	no	substantial	business	activities	in	the	Area	of	the	Contracting	
Party	in	which	it	is	organized;	or	
(2)	an	Investment,	if	the	denying	Contracting	Party	establishes	that	such	Investment	
is	 an	 Investment	of	 an	 Investor	of	 a	 third	 state	with	or	 as	 to	which	 the	denying	
Contracting	Party:	
(a)	does	not	maintain	a	diplomatic	relationship;	or	
(b)	adopts	or	maintains	measures	that:	
(i)	prohibit	transactions	with	Investors	of	that	state;	or	
(ii)	would	be	violated	or	circumvented	if	the	benefits	of	this	Part	were	accorded	
to	Investors	of	that	state	or	to	their	Investments.	
	
23 The	United	States-Panama	Trade	Promotion	Agreement,	in	force	on	31	October	2012,	
refers	to	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	in	Article	10.12:	
	
1.	A	Party	may	deny	the	benefits	of	this	Chapter	to	an	investor	of	the	other	Party	
that	 is	 an	 enterprise	 of	 such	 other	 Party	 and	 to	 investments	 of	 that	 investor	 if	
persons	of	a	non-Party	own	or	control	the	enterprise	and	the	denying	Party:		
(a)	does	not	maintain	diplomatic	relations	with	the	non-Party;	or		
(b)	adopts	or	maintains	measures	with	respect	to	the	non-Party	or	a	person	of	the	
non-Party	that	prohibit	transactions	with	the	enterprise	or	that	would	be	violated	
or	circumvented	if	the	benefits	of	this	Chapter	were	accorded	to	the	enterprise	or	
to	its	investments.		
2.	 Subject	 to	 Articles	 18.3	 (Notification	 and	 Provision	 of	 Information)	 and	 20.4	
(Consultations),	a	Party	may	deny	the	benefits	of	this	Chapter	to	an	investor	of	the	
other	 Party	 that	 is	 an	 enterprise	 of	 such	 other	 Party	 and	 to	 investments	 of	 that	
investor	if	the	enterprise	has	no	substantial	business	activities	in	the	territory	of	the	
other	Party,	and	persons	of	a	non-Party,	or	of	the	denying	Party,	own	or	control	the	
enterprise.		
	
24 The	US-Bolivia	BIT,	 entered	 into	 force	on	6	 June	2001	and	 terminated	on	10	 June	
2012,	is	interesting	to	mention	in	this	context	as	it	includes	the	Letter	of	Submittal	
from	the	US,	in	which	Article	XII	of	the	BIT	referring	to	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	
is	explained.	The	‘denial	of	benefits’	provision	refers	to	the	following:	
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Each	Party	reserves	the	right	to	deny	to	a	company	of	the	other	Party	the	benefits	
of	this	Treaty	if	nationals	of	a	third	country	own	or	control	the	company	and:	
(a)	the	denying	Party	does	not	maintain	normal	economic	relations	with	the	third	
country;	or	
(b)	the	company	has	no	substantial	business	activities	in	the	territory	of	the	Party	
under	whose	laws	it	is	constituted	or	organized.	
	
25 As	explained,	
	
Article	XII(a)	preserves	the	right	of	each	Party	to	deny	the	benefits	of	the	Treaty	to	
a	company	owned	or	controlled	by	nationals	of	a	non-Party	country	with	which	the	
denying	Party	does	not	have	normal	economic	relations,	e.g.,	a	country	to	which	it	
is	applying	economic	sanctions.	For	example,	at	this	time	the	United	States	does	not	
maintain	normal	economic	relations	with,	among	other	countries,	Cuba	and	Libya.	
Article	XII(b)	permits	each	Party	to	deny	the	benefits	of	the	Treaty	to	a	company	of	
the	other	Party	if	the	company	is	owned	or	controlled	by	non-Party	nationals	and	if	
the	 company	 has	 no	 substantial	 business	 activities	 in	 the	 Party	 where	 it	 is	
established.	 Thus,	 the	 United	 States	 could	 deny	 benefits	 to	 a	 company	 that	 is	 a	
subsidiary	of	a	shell	company	organized	under	the	laws	of	Bolivia	if	controlled	by	
nationals	of	a	third	country.	However,	this	provision	would	not	generally	permit	the	
United	States	 to	deny	benefits	 to	a	company	of	Bolivia	 that	maintains	 its	 central	
administration	or	principal	place	of	business	in	the	territory	of,	or	has	a	real	and	
continuous	link	with,	Bolivia	(Letter	of	Submittal,	XI	from	US).	
	
26 The	new	generation	of	IIAs,	although	not	departing	from	the	established	wording	of	
the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause,	attempts	to	address	controversial	issues	raised	by	the	
interpretation	 of	 this	 provision	by	 arbitral	 tribunals.	 For	 example,	Article	 8	 of	 the	
Iran-Slovakia	BIT,	entered	into	force	on	30	August	2017,	spells	out	the	requirements	
for	the	application	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	provision,	as	follows:	
	
1.	The	benefits	of	this	Agreement	shall	be	denied	to	an	investor	of	the	Home	State	
that	is	an	enterprise	of	the	Home	State	and	to	investments	of	that	investor	if	natural	
persons	or	enterprises	of	a	non-Contracting	Party	own	or	control	such	enterprise	
or	any	part	of	it	and	the	Host	State:	
a) does	not	maintain	diplomatic	relations	with	the	non-Contracting	Party;	or	
b) adopts	or	maintains	measures	with	respect	to	the	non-Contracting	Party	or	a	
natural	 person	 or	 enterprise	 of	 the	 non-Contracting	 Party	 that	 prohibit	
transactions	with	such	natural	person	or	enterprise	or	that	would	be	violated	or	
circumvented	if	the	benefits	of	this	Agreement	were	accorded	to	such	investor	
or	to	its	investments.	
2.	The	benefits	of	this	Agreement	shall	be	denied	to	an	investor	of	the	Home	State	
that	is	an	enterprise	of	the	Home	State	and	to	investments	of	that	investor	if	natural	
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persons	or	enterprises	of	the	Host	State	own	or	control	the	enterprise	or	any	part	
of	it.	
3.	For	avoidance	of	any	doubt	the	benefits	of	this	Agreement	shall	be	denied	if	the	
preconditions	 set	 down	 in	 paragraph	 1	 are	 fulfilled	 at	 time	 when	 the	 claim	 is	
submitted	pursuant	to	Article	17.		
	
27 The	Hong	Kong,	China	SAR	–	ASEAN	Investment	Agreement	(2017)	is	relevant	too	in	
this	regard.	In	particular,	Article	19.5	provides:		
	
A	Party’s	right	to	deny	the	benefits	of	this	Agreement	as	provided	for	in	this	Article	
may	 be	 exercised	 at	 any	 time,	 including	 after	 the	 institution	 of	 arbitration	
proceedings	on	accordance	with	Article	20	 (Settlement	of	 Investment	Disputes	
between	a	Party	and	an	Investor.	
	
28 A	similar	wording	can	be	seen	in	the	China-Hong	Kong	CEPA	Investment	Agreement	
where	Article	21	provides:	
	
One	 side	may,	 at	 any	 time	 including	after	 the	 institution	of	 any	proceedings	 in	
accordance	with	Chapter	3	(Investment	Facilitation	and	Settlement	of	Disputes),	
deny	 the	 benefits	 of	 this	Agreement	 to	 an	 investor	 of	 the	 other	 side	 that	 is	 an	
enterprise	of	that	other	side	and	to	covered	investments	of	that	investor	if:	
(i)	investors	of	any	other	party	own	or	control	the	enterprise;	
and	
(ii)	 the	 denying	 side	 adopts	 or	maintains	measures	with	 respect	 to	 that	 other	
party:	
1.	that	prohibit	transactions	with	the	enterprise;	or	
2.	that	would	be	violated	or	circumvented	if	the	benefits	of	this	Agreement	were	
accorded	to	the	enterprise	or	to	its	covered	investments.	
	
29 Article	 8.16	 of	 the	 Canada-EU	 Comprehensive	 Trade	 and	 Economic	 Agreement	
(‘CETA’),	not	yet	in	force,	refers	to	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	in	the	following	terms:	
	
A	Party	may	deny	the	benefits	of	this	Chapter	to	an	investor	of	the	other	Party	that	
is	an	enterprise	of	that	Party	and	to	investments	of	that	investor	if:	
(a)	an	investor	of	a	third	country	owns	or	controls	the	enterprise;	and	
(b)	 the	 denying	 Party	 adopts	 or	maintains	 a	measure	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 third	
country	that:	
(i)	relates	to	the	maintenance	of	international	peace	and	security;	and	
(ii)	 prohibits	 transactions	 with	 the	 enterprise	 or	 would	 be	 violated	 or	
circumvented	if	the	benefits	of	this	Chapter	were	accorded	to	the	enterprise	or	
to	its	investments.	
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30 Further,	 Article	 13	 of	 the	 Model	 Agreement	 Between	 The	 Belgium-Luxembourg	
Economic	 Union,	 adopted	 on	 28	March	 2019	 provides	 that	 the	 conditions	 for	 the	
application	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	must	be	met	at	the	time	of	the	submissions	
of	the	claims	to	arbitration:	
1.	A	Contracting	Party	may	deny	the	benefits	of	this	Agreement	to	an	investor	of	the	
other	 Contracting	 Party	 that	 is	 an	 enterprise	 of	 that	 Contracting	 Party	 and	 to	
investments	of	that	investor	if:	
(a)	the	investors	of	a	non-	Contracting	Party	own	or	controls	the	enterprise;	and	
(b)	the	denying	Contracting	Party	adopts	or	maintains	a	measure	with	respect	to	
the	 non-	 Contracting	 Party,	 or	 a	 natural	 person,	 or	 an	 enterprise	 of	 the	 non-
Contracting	Party	that:	
a.	are	related	to	the	maintenance	of	international	peace	and	security;	
b.	 prohibit	 transactions	 with	 such	 natural	 person	 or	 enterprise	 or	 would	 be	
violated	or	 circumvented	 if	 the	 benefits	 of	 this	 Chapter	were	 accorded	 to	 the	
investor	or	to	its	investments.	
2.	For	avoidance	of	any	doubt,	the	benefits	of	this	Agreement	shall	be	denied	if	the	
preconditions	 set	 down	 in	 paragraph	 1	 are	 fulfilled	 at	 time	 when	 the	 claim	 is	
submitted	pursuant	to	Article	19	(D).	
	
31 Article	16(3)	of	Brazil-Angola	Cooperation	and	 Investment	Facilitation	Agreement,	
entered	 into	 force	 on	 11	 October	 2017,	 includes	 the	 following	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	
clause:	
	
Subject	to	prior	notification	and	consultation,	any	Party	may	deny	the	benefits	of	
this	Agreement	to	an	investor	of	the	other	Party	or	to	investments	of	this	investor,	
if:	
i. the	investor	natural	person	is	not	a	national	or	permanent	resident	of	the	
other	Party,	in	accordance	with	its	laws;	
ii. the	investor	legal	person:	
a. is	not	constituted	in	accordance	with	the	laws	of	one	of	the	Parties,	
does	not	have	the	seat	in	the	territory	of	one	of	the	Parties	and	there	
does	not	have	substantial	business	or	activities;	or	
b. it	is	not	the	property	of	or	effectively	controlled,	directly	or	indirectly,	
by	 nationals	 or	 permanent	 residents	 of	 the	 Parties,	 in	 accordance	
with	the	applicable	laws.	(unofficial	English	translation)	
	
32 Article	14.17	of	Japan-Australia	FTA,	entered	into	force	on	15	January	2015,	refers	to	
the	following	elements	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause,	also	including	definitions	of	
certain	terms	employed	by	this	provision:		
	
1.	A	Party	may	deny	the	benefits	of	this	Chapter	to	an	investor	of	the	other	Party	
that	is	an	enterprise	of	the	other	Party	and	to	its	investments,	where	the	denying	
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Party	establishes	that	the	enterprise	 is	owned	or	controlled	by	an	 investor	of	a	
non-Party	and	the	denying	Party:	
(a) does	not	maintain	diplomatic	relations	with	the	non-Party;	or		
(b) adopts	or	maintains	measures	with	respect	to	the	non-Party	that	prohibit	
transactions	 with	 the	 enterprise	 or	 that	 would	 be	 violated	 or	
circumvented	 if	 the	 benefits	 of	 this	 Chapter	 were	 accorded	 to	 the	
enterprise	or	to	its	investments.	
2.	A	Party	may	deny	the	benefits	of	this	Chapter	to	an	investor	of	the	other	Party	
that	is	an	enterprise	of	the	other	Party	and	to	its	investments,	where	the	denying	
Party	establishes	that	the	enterprise	 is	owned	or	controlled	by	an	investor	of	a	
non-Party	or	of	the	denying	Party	and	the	enterprise	has	no	substantial	business	
activities	in	the	Area	of	the	other	Party.	
	
Note:	For	the	purposes	of	this	Article,	an	enterprise	is:	
(a) ‘owned’	by	an	investor	if	more	than	50	per	cent	of	the	equity	interest	in	it	is	
beneficially	owned	by	the	investor;	and	
(b) ‘controlled’	by	an	investor	if	the	investor	has	the	power	to	name	a	majority	of	
its	directors	or	otherwise	to	legally	direct	its	actions.	
	
33 Article	 21	 of	 Benin-Canada	 BIT,	 entered	 into	 force	 on	 12	May	 2014,	 includes	 the	
following	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause:	
	
A	Contracting	Party	may	deny	the	benefits	of	this	Chapter	to	an	investor	of	the	other	
Contracting	Party	that	is	an	enterprise	of	that	Contracting	Party	and	to	investments	
of	that	investor	if	investors	of	a	non-Party	or	of	the	denying	Contracting	Party	own	
or	control	the	enterprise	and:		
(a) the	denying	Contracting	Party	adopts	or	maintains	measures	with	respect	to	the	
non-Party	 that	 prohibit	 transactions	 with	 the	 enterprise	 or	 that	 would	 be	
violated	or	circumvented	 if	 the	benefits	of	 this	Chapter	were	accorded	to	the	
enterprise	or	to	its	investments;	or	
(b) the	 enterprise	 has	 no	 substantial	 business	 activities	 in	 the	 territory	 of	 the	
Contracting	Party	under	whose	domestic	law	it	is	constituted	or	organized.	
	
34 Whilet	is	evident	that	‘denial	of	benefits’	clauses	have	evolved	over	time	and	started	
to	be	incorporated	more	frequently	by	States	in	their	treaties,	they	are	still	to	become	
a	typical	presence	in	IIAs.	
	
C.	Application	of	the	‘Denial	of	Benefits’	Clause	
	
35 The	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause,	 as	 explained,	 performs	 the	 essential	 function	 of	
preventing	 the	misuse	 of	 the	 protection	 accorded	 by	 IIAs,	 in	 particular	 when	 the	
investor	 is	a	 legal	person	has	minimal	 connection	 to	 its	alleged	home	State.	 In	 the	
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words	 of	 the	 arbitral	 tribunal	 in	 Waste	 Management	 v.	 Mexico,	 explaining	 the	
provisions	of	NAFTA	in	this	context,	
	
Chapter	11	of	NAFTA	spells	out	in	detail	and	with	evident	care	the	conditions	for	
commencing	arbitrations	under	its	provisions.	...	The	relevant	provisions	cover	the	
full	range	of	possibilities,	including	direct	and	indirect	control	and	ownership.	They	
deal	with	possible	‘protection	shopping’,	i.e.	with	situations	where	the	substantial	
control	or	ownership	of	an	enterprise	of	a	Party	lies	with	an	investor	of	a	non-party	
and	the	enterprise	‘has	no	substantial	business	activities	in	the	territory	of	the	Party	
under	whose	law	it	is	constituted	or	organized’.	In	other	words	NAFTA	addresses	
situations	where	the	investor	is	simply	an	intermediary	for	interests	substantially	
foreign,	and	it	allows	NAFTA	protections	to	be	withdrawn	in	such	cases	(subject	to	
prior	notification	and	consultation)	(Waste	Management	v.	Mexico,	2004	para	80).	
	
36 As	summarized	by	the	tribunal	in	Guaracachi	v.	Bolivia,	certain	conditions	within	the	
relevant	framework	of	the	applicable	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	must	be	observed:	
	
Considering	 the	 requirements	 of	 Article	 XII	 [of	 the	 US-Bolivia	 BIT,	 ‘denial	 of	
benefits’	clause],	the	Tribunal	must	determine	whether	the	denial	is	valid	rationae	
[sic]	materiae,	which	requires	that	the	Tribunal	be	convinced	that	GAI	is	owned	or	
controlled	by	a	national	of	a	third	country	(other	than	the	US)	and	that	GAI	has	no	
substantial	business	activities	in	the	US.	Further,	the	Tribunal	must	also	determine	
whether	the	denial	of	benefits	is	valid	rationae	[sic]	temporis,	which	requires	that	
the	Tribunal	be	convinced	as	to	the	timeliness	of	the	denial	of	benefits	(Guaracachi	
v.	Bolivia,	2014,	para	367).	
	
37 We	will	take	a	brief	look	below	at	the	issues	raised	by	the	application	of	the	‘denial	of	
benefits’	clause,	by	first	reviewing	the	procedural	aspects	of	the	submission	of	such	
provision	before	arbitral	tribunals,	and,	subsequently,	by	examining	the	substantive	
requirements	(or	ratione	materiae,	as	referred	to	by	the	Waste	Management	arbitral	
tribunal)	of	such	provision.	As	will	be	shown,	grasping	the	application	of	the	‘denial	
of	 benefits’	 clause	 is	 not	 a	 straightforward	 task	 and,	 although	 a	 rather	 uniform	
language	across	IIAs	can	be	detected	with	respect	to	such	provision,	arbitral	tribunals	
often	come	to	divergent	conclusions.	
	
1.	Procedural	Aspects	
	
a.	Exercising	the	Right	to	Deny	the	Benefits	of	an	International	Investment	Agreement	
	
38 Probably	the	natural	question	triggered	by	the	presence	of	a	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	
in	an	IIA	is	whether	the	denying	State	can	benefit	from	the	automatic	application	of	
the	provision	when	the	conditions	spelled	out	in	it	are	met	or,	to	the	contrary,	if	the	
State	must	exercise	this	‘denial	of	benefits’	right	before	the	putative	investor	files	its	
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claim.	Generally,	 the	 language	of	 the	 IIAs	 includes	 reference	 to	 ‘[e]ach	Contracting	
Party	reserves	the	right	to	deny’,	as	it	is	the	case	of	Article	17	of	the	ECT,	or	to	‘[a]	
Party	may	deny’,	as	in	Article	14.17	of	Japan-Australia	FTA.	Such	language	implies	that	
this	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 right	must	 be	 exercised	 by	 the	 host	 State.	 Few	 IIAs	would	
contain	 a	wording	which	 could	 suggest	 the	 automatic	 application	 of	 the	 ‘denial	 of	
benefits’	clause,	as	 it	 is	 the	case	of	Article	8	of	 Iran-Slovakia	BIT	referring	to	 ‘[t]he	
benefits	of	this	Agreement	shall	be	denied’	(Plama	v.	Bulgaria,	2005	para	156).	
	
39 In	Plama	v.	Bulgaria,	the	arbitral	tribunal	analysed	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	under	
Article	17	of	the	ECT	and	held	that	Bulgaria	must	exercise	this	right:	
	
In	the	Tribunal’s	view,	the	existence	of	a	‘right’	is	distinct	from	the	exercise	of	that	
right.	 For	 example,	 a	 party	 may	 have	 a	 contractual	 right	 to	 refer	 a	 claim	 to	
arbitration;	but	there	can	be	no	arbitration	unless	and	until	that	right	is	exercised.	
In	the	same	way,	a	Contracting	Party	has	a	right	under	Article	17(1)	ECT	to	deny	a	
covered	investor	the	advantages	under	Part	III;	but	it	is	not	required	to	exercise	that	
right;	and	it	may	never	do	so.	The	language	of	Article	17(1)	is	unambiguous;	and	
that	meaning	is	consistent	with	the	different	state	practices	of	the	ECT’s	Contracting	
States	under	different	bilateral	investment	treaties	…	(Plama	v.	Bulgaria,	2005	para	
155).	
	
40 A	similar	conclusion	was	reached	by	the	tribunal	in	Liman	Oil	v.	Kazakhstan:	
	
Taking	into	account	the	above	contentions	of	the	Parties,	the	Tribunal	notes	that	
there	is	no	disagreement	between	the	Parties	on	the	point	that	Article	17	contains	
a	notification	requirement	to	the	effect	that	a	state	must	expressly	invoke	Article	
17(1)	of	the	ECT	to	rely	on	the	rights	under	that	provision.	The	Tribunal	agrees	that	
this	is	the	only	interpretation	that	can	be	drawn	from	the	wording	that	the	host	state	
‘reserves	the	right	to	deny	the	advantages	of	this	Part’.	To	reserve	a	right,	it	has	to	
be	exercised	in	an	explicit	way	(Liman	Oil	v.	Kazakhstan,	2010	para	224).	
	
41 In	Ascom	v.	Kazakhstan,	the	arbitral	tribunal	expressed	the	same	position,	noting	that	
‘Art.	17	ECT	would	only	apply	if	a	state	invoked	that	provision	to	deny	benefits	to	an	
investor	before	a	dispute	arose	and	Respondent	did	not	exercise	this	right’	(Ascom	v.	
Kazakhstan,	2013,	para	745).	
	
42 The	 arbitral	 tribunal	 in	Khan	 Resources	 v.	 Mongolia,	 in	 holding	 that	 the	 ‘denial	 of	
benefits’	right	must	be	exercised	by	the	denying	State,	put	forward	a	more	incisive	
approach	to	this	matter:	
	
Article	17(1)	of	the	ECT	provides	that	the	Contracting	Party	‘reserves	the	right’	to	
deny	the	benefits	of	Part	III	of	the	ECT.	The	ordinary	meaning	of	the	verb	‘to	reserve’	
suggests	 that	 the	 right	 to	 deny	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 Treaty	 is	 being	 kept	 by	 the	
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Contracting	Party,	 to	be	exercised	 in	 the	 future.	Had	Article	17	been	 intended	to	
deny	 benefits	 automatically,	 it	 could	 easily	 have	 been	 phrased	 to	 do	 so.	 A	
formulation	such	as:	‘The	advantages	of	Part	III	of	the	ECT	shall	be	denied	to’	would	
have	 made	 such	 meaning	 plain.	 This	 leads	 the	 Tribunal	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	
Contracting	Party’s	right	to	deny	the	benefits	of	Part	III	of	the	ECT	must	be	exercised	
actively.	
The	 interpretation	 that	Article	 17	 requires	 an	 active	 exercise	 of	 the	 Contracting	
Party’s	right	to	deny	the	benefits	of	Part	III	of	the	ECT	is	in	line	with	the	Treaty’s	
object	and	purpose	(Khan	Resources	v.	Mongolia,	2012	paras	419	and	421).	
	
43 After	establishing	that	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	right	must	be	actively	exercised	by	the	
respondent	 State,	 arbitral	 tribunals	 embarked	 on	 assessing	 the	 proper	manner	 in	
which	such	exercise	should	be	effected.	In	Plama	v.	Bulgaria,	the	tribunal	considered	
that		
	
The	exercise	would	necessarily	be	associated	with	publicity	or	other	notice	so	as	to	
become	reasonably	available	to	investors	and	their	advisers.	To	this	end,	a	general	
declaration	 in	 a	 Contracting	 State’s	 official	 gazette	 could	 suffice;	 or	 a	 statutory	
provision	in	a	Contracting	State’s	investment	or	other	laws;	or	even	an	exchange	of	
letters	with	 a	 particular	 investor	 or	 class	 of	 investors.	 Given	 that	 in	 practice	 an	
investor	must	distinguish	between	Contracting	States	with	different	state	practices,	
it	is	not	unreasonable	or	impractical	to	interpret	Article	17(1)	as	requiring	that	a	
Contracting	State	must	exercise	 its	right	before	applying	 it	 to	an	 investor	and	be	
seen	to	have	done	so	(Plama	v.	Bulgaria,	2005	para	157).	
	
44 As	further	explained	by	the	Plama	tribunal,	‘[b]y	itself,	Article	17(1)	ECT	is	at	best	only	
half	a	notice;	without	further	reasonable	notice	of	 its	exercise	by	the	host	state,	 its	
terms	tell	the	investor	little;	and	for	all	practical	purposes,	something	more	is	needed’	
(Plama	 v.	 Bulgaria,	 2005	 para	 157).	 The	 arbitral	 tribunal	 in	 Khan	 Resources	 v.	
Mongolia	concurred	with	this	approach:	‘[c]oncerning	the	manner	in	which	the	host	
state’s	right	may	be	exercised,	the	Tribunal	concurs	with	the	Plama	tribunal’	(	para	
423).	
	
45 Some	 IIAs	 require	 a	prior	notification	and/or	 consultation	procedure	between	 the	
parties	to	the	applicable	IIA,	before	effectively	denying	the	benefits	of	that	treaty	to	
the	putative	investors.	For	example,	Article	1113	of	NAFTA	provides	that	‘a	Party	may	
deny	the	benefits	of	this	Chapter’	only	‘[s]ubject	to	prior	notification	and	consultation	
in	 accordance	 with	 Articles	 1803	 (Notification	 and	 Provision	 of	 Information)	 and	
2006	(Consultations)’	of	NAFTA.	Other	IIAs,	such	as	Article	2(2)	of	the	Australia-Czech	
Republic	BIT,	refer	to	a	joint	consultation	between	the	Contracting	Parties	upon	which	
they	 ‘may	 decide	…	 not	 to	 extend	 the	 rights	 and	 benefits	 of	 this	 Agreement’.	 It	 is	
understood	that	such	obligation	of	prior	consultations	between	the	parties	to	the	IIAs	
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is	satisfied	if	such	consultations	are	carried	out	and,	arguably,	 in	good	faith,	rather	
than	if	and	when	an	agreement	is	reached	between	the	parties.	
	
46 In	Ampal	v.	Egypt,	the	arbitral	tribunal	considered	the	following	wording	of	paragraph	
1	of	the	Protocol	of	11	March	1986	to	the	US-Egypt	BIT,	entered	into	force	on	27	June	
1992:	
	
Each	Party	reserves	the	right	to	deny	the	benefits	of	this	Treaty	to	any	company	of	
either	Party,	or	its	affiliates	or	subsidiaries,	if	nationals	of	any	third	country	control	
such	company,	affiliate	or	subsidiary;	provided	that,	whenever	one	Party	concludes	
that	 the	 benefits	 of	 this	 Treaty	 should	 not	 be	 extended	 for	 this	 reason,	 it	 shall	
promptly	consult	with	the	other	Party	to	seek	a	mutually	satisfactory	resolution	of	
this	matter.		
2.	‘Control’	means	to	have	a	substantial	share	of	ownership	rights	and	the	ability	to	
exercise	 decisive	 influence.	 Differences	 as	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 control	 shall	 be	
resolved	according	to	the	provisions	of	Article	VIII	[Settlement	of	Disputes	Between	
the	Parties	Concerning	Interpretation	or	Application	of	this	Treaty].	
	
47 Under	this	provision,	the	arbitral	tribunal	concluded	that	the	conditions	set	forth	in	
the	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 consultation	 requirement	were	not	
fulfilled:	
	
The	Party	wishing	to	invoke	the	denial-of-benefits	provision	of	the	Treaty	has	the	
obligation	 to	 consult	 with	 the	 other	 Patty	 in	 order	 to	 search	 for	 a	 mutually	
satisfactory	resolution	of	the	matter	and	such	consultations	must	be	held	promptly	
(Ampal	v.	Egypt,	2016	para	147).	
	
48 As	summarized	by	the	tribunal	in	Ampal	v.	Egypt,	Egypt	conveyed	its	decision	to	the	
United	States	on	23	January	2013,	as	a	‘“fait	accompli”’	rather	than	invited	to	engage	
in	a	process	of	consultation	in	order	to	seek	a	mutually	satisfactory	resolution	of	the	
issue	raised	by	Egypt’,	although	there	has	been	correspondence	between	Egypt	and	
the	 US,	 but	 nothing	 which	 would	 indicate	 that	 there	 were	 ‘consultations	 such	 as	
clearly	 envisaged	 in	 the	 Protocol.’	 (Ampal	 v.	 Egypt,	 2016	 para.	 150)	 As	 such,	 the	
tribunal	concluded,	Egypt’s	‘denial	of	benefits	to	Ampal	was	thus	ineffective’	(Ampal	
v.	Egypt,	2016	paras	150-151).	The	Ampal	tribunal	distinguished	this	particular	case	
from	the	Pac-Rim	Cayman	LLC	v.	Republic	of	El	Salvador,	where	the	arbitral	tribunal	
had	 to	 assess	 the	provision	of	Article	 10.12	of	 CAFTA-DR,	 entered	 into	 force	 on	1	
January	2009.	With	a	similar	wording	to	Article	1113	of	NAFTA,	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	
provision	under	CAFTA-DR	provides	that	‘[s]ubject	to	Articles	18.3	(Notification	and	
Provision	of	Information)	and	20.4	(Consultations),	a	Party	may	deny	the	benefits	of	
this	 Chapter’.	 The	Ampal	 tribunal	 considered	 that	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 discretionary	
consultations	 under	 Article	 10-12	 of	 CAFTA-DR,	 the	 consultations	 pursuant	 to	
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paragraph	1	of	the	Protocol	to	the	US-Egypt	BIT	are	mandatory	(Ampal	v.	Egypt,	2016,	
para	156.	
	
49 The	manner	in	which	the	host	State	should	exercise	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	right	and	
any	prior	notification	or	consultations	requirements	are	intertwined.	While	the	first	
concerns	the	relation	between	the	host	State	and	the	putative	investor,	and	the	second	
concerns	the	relation	between	the	parties	to	the	applicable	IIA	containing	the	‘denial	
of	 benefits’	 clause,	 both	 are	meant	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 clause	produces	 the	desired	
effects.	Both	aspects	ensure	the	correct	application	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause,	
in	 the	 sense	 that,	 on	 one	 hand,	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 parties	 to	 the	 relevant	 IIA	 are	
preserved	and	benefits	of	the	treaty	are	granted	to	proper	investors,	and,	on	the	other,	
investors	 investing	 in	 the	 host	 State	 and	 committing	 significant	 resources	 in	 this	
respect,	are	protected	from	any	abusive	invocation	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause.	
	
50 With	respect	to	the	notification	or	consultation	requirement,	this	must	be	spelled	out	
in	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	and	appropriate	steps	must	be	taken	by	the	parties	to	
the	 IIA.	 Arguably,	 when	 notification	 or	 consultation	 steps	 are	 not	 included	 in	 the	
‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause,	 the	 State	 parties	 to	 the	 IIA	 intended	 to	 increase	 the	
prerogatives	 of	 the	 denying	 State	 in	 respect	 to	 these	 putative	 investors	 and	 their	
investments	(Mistelis	and	Baltag,	2009,	1320).	As	suggested	by	the	tribunal	in	Ampal	
v.	Egypt,	such	negotiations	or	consultation	may	be	mandatory	or	not.	If	mandatory,	
the	 failure	 to	proceed	with	 them	would	 trigger	 the	 inapplicability	of	 the	 ‘denial	of	
benefits’	clause.	Possible	difficulties	would	arise	in	practice	related	to	the	manner	in	
which	such	notifications	or	consultations	would	take	place,	in	particular	when	the	IIA	
does	not	contain	separate	provisions	dealing	with	these	mechanisms	of	notification	
and	consultation,	such	as	it	is	the	case	of	NAFTA.	
	
51 The	manner	 in	 which	 the	 host	 State	 exercises	 the	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause	 with	
respect	to	the	putative	investor	tends	to	be	more	controversial.	This	aspect	is	closely	
connected	to	 the	timing	of	 the	 ‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	discussed	below,	which	 is	
when	the	host	State	can	exercise	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	right	against	the	investor.		
	
52 The	Plama	tribunal	considered	that	the	exercise	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	must	
be	associated	‘with	publicity	or	other	notice	so	as	to	become	reasonably	available	to	
investors	and	their	advisers.’	At	the	same	time,	in	order	to	preserve	the	object	and	
purpose	 of	 the	 applicable	 IIA,	 such	 notice,	 as	 explained	 by	 the	 tribunal	 in	 Khan	
Resources	v.	Mongolia,	relying	on	the	decision	of	Plama	tribunal,	must	be	given	to	the	
investor	in	a	transparent	manner,	and,	in	any	case,	before	the	investor	chooses	to	rely	
on	the	provisions	of	the	denied	benefits	under	the	IIA	in	the	arbitration	proceedings.	
The	approach	makes	sense	if	one	considers	the	interests	of	the	putative	investor.	To	
this	extent,	a	proper	–	or	public	–	notice,	given	before	the	investor	decides	to	rely	on	
the	dispute	settlement	mechanism	under	the	IIA,	should	be	retained.	However,	this	
method	 appears	 to	 ignore	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause	 in	
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accordance	with	 the	principles	of	 treaty	 interpretation,	as	well	as	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
interests	of	host	States	 should	be	equally	upheld	 in	 this	 context.	On	 the	 first	 limb,	
arbitral	tribunals	are	called	upon	to	apply	the	relevant	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause.	If	
the	wording	 of	 the	 clause	 does	 not	 lead	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 notification	 of	
investor	is	required	and,	furthermore,	no	time	limits	are	associated	with	the	exercise	
of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	right,	arbitral	tribunals	should	be	cautious	in	reading	such	
prerequisites	 into	 this	 clause.	 While	 relying	 on	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 the	
applicable	 IIA	 is	 appropriate	 in	 the	 context	 of	 treaty	 interpretation,	 this	 cannot	
contradict	the	textual	interpretation	of	the	applicable	provision.	If	the	parties	to	the	
treaty	 intended	to	add	certain	prerequisites	or	 limitations	 in	the	application	of	the	
‘denial	of	benefits’	clause,	they	would	have	provided	for	those	in	the	same	manner	as	
for	prior	notification	or	consultation	between	the	States	parties	to	the	relevant	IIA.	
Furthermore,	under	certain	treaties,	a	general	notice	extended	to	investors	might	be	
considered	 to	 breach	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 respective	 treaties	 prohibiting	 any	
reservations,	as	is	the	case	of	Article	46	of	the	ECT	providing	that	‘[n]o	reservations	
may	be	made	to	this	Treaty’.	One	would	also	assess	the	opportunity	of	such	a	prior	
notice.	In	reality,	host	States	become	aware	of	investors	and	their	particularities,	and,	
more	specifically,	whether	they	fit	into	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	situation,	at	the	time	
they	are	served	with	the	request	for	arbitration.		
	
53 As	such,	it	is	difficult	to	imagine	a	situation	in	which	a	host	State	diligently	serves	the	
putative	investors	with	the	notice	for	the	application	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause,	
before	disputes	with	them	arise.	 In	addition,	one	would	wonder	whether	a	general	
notice,	as	suggested	by	Plama	tribunal,	if	allowed	under	the	text	of	the	applicable	IIA,	
is	 an	 effective	 one,	 considering	 that	 such	 general	 notice	 is	 the	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	
clause	 itself.	 Any	 application	 of	 a	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause	must	 offer	 a	 balanced	
approach,	in	accordance	with	the	text	of	the	provision	interpreted	under	the	rules	of	
interpretation	as	codified	under	Articles	31-33	of	the	Vienna	Convention	on	the	Law	
of	Treaties.	
	
	
b.	Denial	of	Benefits:	Issue	of	Jurisdiction	or	Merits?	
	
54 Distinguishing	between	jurisdiction	and	merits	has	relevant	practical	consequences	
(→	 Jurisdiction;	→	 Admissibility).	 When	 an	 arbitral	 tribunal	 considers	 a	 matter	 to	
pertain	 to	 its	 jurisdiction,	 that	 decision	may	 be	 challenged	 under	 the	 appropriate	
available	 mechanism.	 As	 such,	 erroneously	 considering	 an	 issue	 pertaining	 to	
jurisdiction,	could	‘result	in	an	unjustified	extension	of	the	scope	for	challenging	the	
awards’	 (Paulsson,	2005,	601).	Consequently,	whether	or	not	 the	 invocation	of	 the	
‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause	 relates	 to	 the	 jurisdiction	of	 the	 arbitral	 tribunal	 or	 it	 is	
related	to	the	merits	of	the	dispute,	should	not	be	regarded	as	an	academic	exercise,	
but	as	a	vigorous	approach	with	palpable	–	and	one	could	add,	critical	–	consequences	
(Paulsson,	2005,	617).	
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55 The	position	 of	 arbitral	 tribunals	 should	 not	 be	 considered	 in	 a	 vacuum,	 but	with	
specific	 insight	 into	 the	 relevant	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause,	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	
customary	rules	of	treaty	interpretation	as	codified	by	the	Vienna	Convention	on	the	
Law	 of	 Treaties.	 From	 this	 perspective	 several	 aspects	 would	 likely	 influence	 the	
decision	of	an	arbitral	tribunal.	Among	them,	the	position	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	
clause	in	the	structure	of	the	relevant	IIA,	as	well	as	the	wording	of	the	clause	are	of	
utmost	 significance.	 The	 Decision	 on	 Jurisdiction	 in	 Plama	 v.	 Bulgaria	 is	
representative	in	this	context.	As	explained	by	the	tribunal,		
	
…	the	Respondent’s	jurisdictional	case	here	turns	on	the	effect	of	Articles	17(1)	and	
26	 ECT,	 interpreted	 under	 Article	 31(1)	 of	 the	 Vienna	 Convention.	 The	 express	
terms	of	Article	17	refer	to	a	denial	of	the	advantages	‘of	this	Part’,	thereby	referring	
to	the	substantive	advantages	conferred	upon	an	investor	by	Part	III	of	the	ECT.	The	
language	 is	 unambiguous;	 but	 it	 is	 confirmed	 by	 the	 title	 to	 Article	 17:	 ‘Non-
Application	of	Part	III	in	Certain	Circumstances’.	…	From	these	terms,	interpreted	
in	 good	 faith	 in	 accordance	 with	 their	 ordinary	 contextual	 meaning,	 the	 denial	
applies	 only	 to	 advantages	 under	 Part	 III.	 It	 would	 therefore	 require	 a	 gross	
manipulation	of	the	language	to	make	it	refer	to	Article	26	in	Part	V	of	the	ECT.	
Article	26	provides	a	procedural	remedy	for	a	covered	investor’s	claims;	and	it	is	
not	physically	or	 juridically	part	of	 the	ECT’s	 substantive	advantages	enjoyed	by	
that	investor	under	Part	III.	As	a	matter	of	language,	it	would	have	been	simple	to	
exclude	a	class	of	investors	completely	from	the	scope	of	the	ECT	as	a	whole,	as	do	
certain	 other	 bilateral	 investment	 treaties;	 but	 that	 is	 self-evidently	 not	 the	
approach	 taken	 in	 the	 ECT.	 This	 limited	 exclusion	 from	 Part	 III	 for	 a	 covered	
investor,	dependent	on	certain	specific	criteria,	requires	a	procedure	to	resolve	a	
dispute	as	to	whether	that	exclusion	applies	in	any	particular	case;	and	the	object	
and	purpose	of	 the	ECT,	 in	 the	Tribunal’s	 view,	 clearly	 requires	Article	26	 to	be	
unaffected	by	the	operation	of	Article	17(1)	(Plama	v.	Bulgaria,	2005	paras	147-8).	
	
56 The	arbitral	tribunal	in	Plama	v.	Bulgaria	reinforced	its	conclusion	by	considering	the	
purpose	of	 the	ECT	and	concluded	 that	allowing	an	 interpretation	of	 the	 ‘denial	of	
benefits’	 clause	 as	 denying	 the	 benefits	 of	 Article	 26	 of	 the	 ECT	 –	 the	 procedural	
remedies	made	available	to	investors	–	would	make	the	respondent	contracting	party	
the	judge	of	its	own	cause,	as	investors	would	be	left	without	any	recourse	to	assess	
the	valid	application	of	Article	17:	
	
In	the	absence	of	Article	26	as	a	remedy	available	to	the	covered	investor	(as	the	
Respondent	contends),	how	are	such	disputes	to	be	determined	between	the	host	
state	and	 the	covered	 investor,	given	 that	 such	determination	 is	 crucial	 to	both?	
According	to	the	Respondent,	 there	 is	no	remedy	available	 to	a	covered	 investor	
under	the	ECT	at	all:	it	has	no	advantages	under	the	ECT	at	all;	it	has	no	rights	under	
Article	26	to	amicable	negotiations	or	international	arbitration;	and	any	attempt	to	
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initiate	arbitration	before	ICSID	will	be	met	with	a	demand	by	the	host	state	that	
the	request	for	arbitration	should	not	be	registered	under	Article	36(3)	of	the	ICSID	
Convention.	 …	 Towards	 the	 covered	 investor,	 under	 the	 Respondent’s	 case,	 the	
Contracting	State	invoking	the	application	of	Article	17(1)	is	the	judge	in	its	own	
cause.	That	is	a	license	for	injustice;	and	it	treats	a	covered	investor	as	if	it	were	not	
covered	under	the	ECT	at	all	(Plama	v.	Bulgaria,	2005	para	149).		
	
57 Subsequent	 tribunals	 adopted	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 arbitral	 tribunal	 in	 Plama	 v.	
Bulgaria.	For	example,	the	tribunal	in	the	Yukos	cases	referred	to	this	issue	as	follows:	
	
However,	 insofar	 as	 those	 arguments	 are	 deemed	 to	 address	 the	 question	 of	
whether	 the	 Tribunal	 has	 jurisdiction	 to	 pass	 upon	 the	 merits	 of	 the	 claims	 of	
Claimant,	they	are	not	on	point.	That	is	because	Article	17	specifies—as	does	the	
title	of	that	Article—that	it	concerns	denial	of	the	advantages	of	‘this	Part,’	i.e.,	Part	
III	of	the	ECT.	Provision	for	dispute	settlement	under	the	ECT	is	not	found	in	‘this	
Part’	 but	 in	 Part	 V	 of	 the	 Treaty.	 Whether	 or	 not	 Claimant	 is	 entitled	 to	 the	
advantages	of	Part	III	is	a	question	not	of	jurisdiction	but	of	the	merits.	Since	Article	
17	 relates	not	 to	 the	ECT	as	a	whole,	or	 to	Part	V,	but	exclusively	 to	Part	 III,	 its	
interpretation	 for	 that	 reason	 cannot	 determine	 whether	 the	 Tribunal	 has	
jurisdiction	to	entertain	the	claims	of	Claimant.	…	This	Tribunal	finds	the	reasoning	
of	 the	 Plama	 tribunal	 on	 this	 point	 convincing	 and	 adopts	 it	 (Yukos	 v.	 Russian	
Federation,	 2009	 paras	 441-3;	 Veteran	 Petroleum	 Limited	 v.	 Russian	 Federation,	
2009,	paras	497-9;	Hulley	Enterpises	Limited	v.	Russian	Federation,	2009,	para	440-
2).	
	
58 The	tribunal	in	Ascom	v.	Kazakhstan	was	of	the	same	opinion:	
	
Article	 17	ECT,	 as	 clearly	 indicated	by	 its	 introductory	words	 ‘of	 this	 part’,	 only	
applies	to	Part	III	of	the	ECT,	leaving	unaffected	the	dispute	resolution	provision	in	
Part	V	with	Art.	26	ECT	(Ascom	v.	Kazakhstan,	2013,	para	745).	
	
59 The	 same	position	 that	 the	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause	pertains	 to	 the	merits	 of	 the	
dispute,	rather	than	to	jurisdiction,	was	retained	by	the	arbitral	tribunals	constituted	
under	Article	26	of	 the	ECT,	 in	 Isolux	v.	 Spain	(para	712)	and	 in	Khan	Resources	v.	
Mongolia	 (para	 411),	 as	well	 as	 by	 the	 tribunals	 in	Bridgestone	 v.	 Panama,	 under	
Article	 10.12	 of	 the	 US-Panama	 Free	 Trade	 Agreement,	 entered	 into	 force	 on	 31	
October	2012	(Bridgestone	v.	Panama,	para	288).	
	
60 The	tribunal	in	Ulysseas	v.	Ecuador	considered	the	exercise	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	
right	under	Article	I.2	of	the	US-Ecuador	BIT,	as	pertaining	to	jurisdiction,	rather	than	
to	the	merits	of	the	dispute:	
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In	 the	 Tribunal’s	 view,	 since	 such	 advantages	 include	 BIT	 arbitration,	 a	 valid	
exercise	of	the	right	would	have	the	effect	of	depriving	the	Tribunal	of	jurisdiction	
under	the	BIT	(Ulysseas	v.	Ecuador,	2010	para	172).	
	
61 Similarly,	in	Guaracachi	v.	Bolivia,	the	tribunal	held	that	
	
The	consequence	of	the	denial	of	benefits	is	that	the	Tribunal	(which	forms	part	of	
the	package	of	benefits	afforded	under	the	BIT)	will	be	deprived	of	jurisdiction	over	
the	present	dispute	(Guaracachi	v.	Bolivia,	2014	para	381).	
	
62 Arguably,	irrespective	of	whether	one	considers	that	a	state	cannot	deny	the	benefits	
of	the	substantive	protection	of	a	treaty	without,	implicitly,	denying	the	procedural	
remedies	thereof,	or	formally	approaches	this	denial	as	confined	to	the	substantive	
protection	 strictly,	 investors	 would	 still	 have	 access	 to	 the	 dispute	 resolution	
mechanism	 against	 the	 denying	 state.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 arbitral	 tribunal,	 remains	
competent	to	decide	whether	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	has	been	validly	relied	on	
or	not,	and	as	such,	whether	the	tribunal	has	jurisdiction	to	hear	the	merits	of	the	case.	
(Shore,	2007,	57).	
	
	
c.	When	Should	a	State	Deny	the	Benefits	of	an	International	Investment	Agreement?	
	
63 A	majority	of	the	decisions	of	arbitral	tribunals	addressing	the	application	of	‘denial	
of	benefits’	clauses	surveyed	reveal	the	fact	that	States	rely	on	such	provisions	and	
effectively	deny	the	benefits	of	the	applicable	IIA	when	a	dispute	is	well	underway,	
and	more	specifically,	after	it	becomes	aware	of	the	request	for	arbitration	submitted	
under	the	investor-state	dispute	settlement	provisions.	From	a	practical	point	of	view,	
unless	foreign	investments	have	to	be	authorized	by	the	host	State,	few	denying	States	
will	become	aware	of	a	case	where	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	right	should	be	vigorously	
exercised	before	receiving	the	notice	of	the	dispute	(→	Arbitration	without	privity).	As	
explained	by	the	tribunal	in	Guaracachi	v.	Bolivia,	
	
As	a	matter	of	fact,	it	would	be	odd	for	a	State	to	examine	whether	the	requirements	
of	Article	XII	[‘denial	of	benefits’	clause]	had	been	fulfilled	in	relation	to	an	investor	
with	whom	it	had	no	dispute	whatsoever.	In	that	case,	the	notification	of	the	denial	
of	benefits	would—per	se—be	seen	as	an	unfriendly	and	groundless	act,	contrary	
to	 the	promotion	of	 foreign	 investments.	On	 the	other	 side,	 the	 fulfilment	of	 the	
aforementioned	requirements	is	not	static	and	can	change	from	one	day	to	the	next,	
which	means	that	it	is	only	when	a	dispute	arises	that	the	respondent	State	will	be	
able	to	assess	whether	such	requirements	are	met	and	decide	whether	it	will	deny	
the	benefits	of	the	treaty	in	respect	of	that	particular	dispute	(Guaracachi	v.	Bolivia,	
2014,		para	379).	
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64 As	such,	it	is	for	the	arbitral	tribunal,	under	the	relevant	provisions	of	the	applicable	
IIA	 and	 of	 the	 arbitration	 rules,	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 respondent	 State	 had	
exercised	 the	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 right	 in	 a	 timely	manner.	The	practice	of	 arbitral	
tribunals	under	this	point	varies,	although	some	arbitral	tribunals	advise	for	a	strict	
application	of	 the	 ‘denial	of	benefits’	clause,	given	the	exceptional	character	of	 this	
provision.	For	example,	 in	Ascom	v.	Kazakhstan,	 the	tribunal	held	that	 ‘Art.	17	ECT	
would	 only	 apply	 if	 a	 state	 invoked	 that	 provision	 to	 deny	benefits	 to	 an	 investor	
before	a	dispute	arose’	(Ascom	v.	Kazakhstan,	2013,	para	745).	Similarly,	the	tribunal	
in	Khan	Resources	v.	Mongolia	concluded	that	investor	must	be	given	prior	notice	with	
respect	to	the	exercise	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	right,	in	a	transparent	manner,	and,	
in	any	case,	before	the	investor	chooses	to	rely	on	the	provisions	of	the	denied	benefits	
under	the	IIA	in	the	arbitration	proceedings.	
	
The	Treaty	 seeks	 to	 create	a	predictable	 legal	 framework	 for	 investments	 in	 the	
energy	field.	This	predictability	materializes	only	if	investors	can	know	in	advance	
whether	 they	are	entitled	 to	 the	protections	of	 the	Treaty.	 If	an	 investor	such	as	
Khan	Netherlands,	who	falls	within	the	definition	of	‘Investor’	at	Article	1(7)	of	the	
Treaty	and	 is	 therefore	entitled	 to	 the	Treaty’s	protections	 in	principle,	could	be	
denied	 the	benefit	 of	 the	Treaty	at	 any	moment	after	 it	has	 invested	 in	 the	host	
country,	it	would	find	itself	in	a	highly	unpredictable	situation.	This	lack	of	certainty	
would	 impede	 the	 investor’s	 ability	 to	 evaluate	 whether	 or	 not	 to	 make	 an	
investment	in	any	particular	state.	This	would	be	contrary	to	the	Treaty’s	object	and	
purpose.	
In	contrast,	an	obligation	for	contracting	parties	to	exercise	their	Article	17	right	in	
time	to	give	adequate	notice	to	investors	would	be	consistent	with	the	obligation	of	
host	states	under	Article	10(1)	of	the	Treaty	to	create	‘transparent	conditions’	for	
investments.	
…	A	good	faith	interpretation	does	not	permit	the	Tribunal	to	choose	a	construction	
of	Article	17	that	would	allow	host	states	to	lure	investors	by	ostensibly	extending	
to	them	the	protections	of	the	ECT,	to	then	deny	these	protections	when	the	investor	
attempts	to	invoke	them	in	international	arbitration	(Khan	Resources	v.	Mongolia,	
2012	paras	426-7,	and	429).	
	
65 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 tribunal	 in	Khan	Resources	 followed	 the	position	adopted	by	 the	
tribunal	in	Plama	v.	Bulgaria,	and	more	recently	adopted	by	the	arbitral	tribunal	in	
Masdar	v.	Spain	(Masdar	v.	Spain,	2018	paras	234-6):	
	
The	 covered	 investor	 enjoys	 the	 advantages	 of	 Part	 III	 unless	 the	 host	 state	
exercises	 its	 right	 under	Article	 17(1)	 ECT;	 and	 a	 putative	 covered	 investor	 has	
legitimate	 expectations	 of	 such	 advantages	 until	 that	 right’s	 exercise.	 A	 putative	
investor	therefore	requires	reasonable	notice	before	making	any	investment	in	the	
host	state	whether	or	not	that	host	state	has	exercised	its	right	under	Article	17(1)	
ECT.	At	 that	 stage,	 the	putative	 investor	 can	 so	plan	 its	business	affairs	 to	 come	
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within	or	without	the	criteria	there	specified,	as	it	chooses.	It	can	also	plan	not	to	
make	any	investment	at	all	or	to	make	it	elsewhere.	After	an	investment	is	made	in	
the	host	state,	the	‘hostage-factor’	is	introduced;	the	covered	investor’s	choices	are	
accordingly	more	limited;	and	the	investor	is	correspondingly	more	vulnerable	to	
the	host	state’s	exercise	of	its	right	under	Article	17(1)	ECT.	At	this	time,	therefore,	
the	covered	investor	needs	at	least	the	same	protection	as	it	enjoyed	as	a	putative	
investor	able	 to	plan	 its	 investment.	The	ECT’s	express	 ‘purpose’	under	Article	2	
ECT	is	the	establishment	of	‘...	a	legal	framework	in	order	to	promote	long-term	co-
operation	in	the	energy	field	...	in	accordance	with	the	objectives	and	principles	of	
the	Charter’	…	(Plama	v.	Bulgaria,	2005	para	161).	
	
66 The	question,	of	course,	remains,	as	to	the	practicality	of	such	conclusion,	given	that,	
as	mentioned	before,	host	States	become	aware	of	the	circumstances	triggering	the	
reliance	on	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	only	when	the	investor	notifies	the	claim	to	
the	host	State.	As	mentioned	by	the	US	 in	 its	submission	 in	Pac	Rim	v.	El	Salvador,	
assuming	otherwise	would	imply	an	expectation	of	the	host	State	‘to	monitor	the	ever-
changing	business	activities	of	all	enterprises	in	the	territories	of	each	of	the	other	six	
CAFTA-DR	Parties	that	attempt	to	make,	are	making,	or	have	made	investments	in	the	
territory	of	 the	 respondent’,	which	 ‘would	place	 an	untenable	burden	on	a	CAFTA	
Party’.	(Pacific	Rim	v.	El	Salvador,	2012	para.	4.56)	
	
67 Other	 arbitral	 tribunals,	 under	 the	 ICSID	 Arbitration	 Rules,	 as	 well	 as	 under	 the	
UNCITRAL	Arbitration	Rules,	have	considered	that	the	respondent	State	can	validly	
exercise	 the	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 right	 at	 the	 latest	 when	 raising	 objections	 to	
jurisdiction.	In	EMELEC	v.	Ecuador,	the	tribunal	concluded	that	‘Ecuador	announced	
the	denial	 of	 benefits	 to	EMELEC	at	 the	proper	 stage	of	 the	proceedings,	 i.e.	 upon	
raising	its	objections	on	jurisdiction’	(EMELEC	v.	Ecuador,	2009,	para	71).	In	Pac	Rim	
v.	El	Salvador,	the	arbitral	tribunal,	after	making	a	note	of	the	fact	that	Article	10.12	of	
CAFTA-DR	does	not	include	an	express	time	limit	for	exercise	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	
right,	 held	 that	 under	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 and	 of	 the	 ICSID	
Arbitration	Rules,	the	respondent	State	relied	on	this	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	in	a	
timely	manner:	
	
…	this	is	an	arbitration	subject	to	the	ICSID	Convention	and	the	ICSID	Arbitration	
Rules,	 as	 chosen	 by	 the	 Claimant	 under	 CAFTA	Article	 10.16(3)(a).	 Under	 ICSID	
Arbitration	Rule	41,	any	objection	by	a	respondent	that	the	dispute	is	not	within	the	
jurisdiction	of	the	Centre,	or,	for	other	reasons,	is	not	within	the	competence	of	the	
tribunal	‘shall	be	made	as	early	as	possible’	and	‘no	later	than	the	expiration	of	the	
time	limit	fixed	for	the	filing	of	the	counter-memorial’.	In	the	Tribunal’s	view,	that	
is	 the	 time-limit	 in	 this	 case	 here	 incorporated	 by	 reference	 into	 CAFTA	Article	
10.12.2.	 Any	 earlier	 time-limit	 could	 not	 be	 justified	 on	 the	 wording	 of	 CAFTA	
Article	10.12.2;	and	further,	 it	would	create	considerable	practical	difficulties	 for	
CAFTA	Parties	inconsistent	with	this	provision’s	object	and	purpose,	as	observed	
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by	Costa	Rica	and	the	USA	from	their	different	perspectives	as	host	and	home	States	
(as	 also	 by	 the	 Amicus	 Curiae	 more	 generally).	 In	 the	 Tribunal’s	 view,	 the	
Respondent	has	respected	the	time-limit	imposed	by	ICSID	Arbitration	Rule	41	(In 
Pac	Rim	v.	El	Salvador,	2012, para	4.85).	
	
68 The	tribunal	in	Ulysseas	v.	Ecuador	reached	a	similar	conclusion	under	the	UNCITRAL	
Arbitration	Rules:	
	
The	 first	question	concerns	whether	 there	 is	a	 time-limit	 for	 the	exercise	by	 the	
State	of	the	right	to	deny	the	BIT’s	advantages.	…	According	to	the	UNCITRAL	Rules,	
a	jurisdictional	objection	must	be	raised	not	later	than	in	the	statement	of	defence	
(Article	21(3)).	By	exercising	the	right	to	deny	Claimant	the	BIT’s	advantages	in	the	
Answer,	Respondent	has	complied	with	the	time	limit	prescribed	by	the	UNCITRAL	
Rules.	Nothing	 in	Article	 I(2)	of	 the	BIT	excludes	that	 the	right	to	deny	the	BIT’s	
advantages	be	exercised	by	the	State	at	the	time	when	such	advantages	are	sought	
by	the	 investor	through	a	request	 for	arbitration	(Ulysseas	v.	Ecuador,	2010	para	
172).	
	
69 Also,	 under	 the	UNCITRAL	Arbitration	Rules,	 the	 arbitral	 tribunal	 in	Guaracachi	 v.	
Bolivia	agreed	with	the	position	of	the	tribunal	in	Ulysseas	v.	Ecuador	and	concluded	
that	‘the	objection	to	jurisdiction	was	made	in	good	time,	taking	into	account	Article	
23(2)	of	the	UNCITRAL	Rules’	(Guaracachi	v.	Bolivia,	2014,	para	382).	
	
70 Nevertheless,	 the	 tribunal	 in	 Ampal	 v.	 Egypt,	 deviating	 from	 the	 decisions	 of	 the	
tribunals	 in	 Pac	 Rim	 v.	 El	 Salvador	 and	 Guaracachi	 v.	 Bolivia	 and	 following	 the	
conclusion	of	the	arbitral	tribunal	in	Plama	v.	Bulgaria,	reasoned	that,	in	the	light	of	
Article	25(1)	of	the	ICSID	Convention,	for	the	denial	of	benefits	to	be	effective,	it	‘must	
be	made	prior	to	the	filing	and	registration	of	the	Request	for	Arbitration’	(Ampal	v.	
Egypt,	para.	170).		
	
	
	
d.	The	Effects	of	the	Exercise	of	the	‘Denial	of	Benefits’	Clause	
	
71 The	effects	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	are	of	high	relevance	to	investors.	If	the	
respondent	 State	 successfully	 invokes	 this	 provision,	 the	 question	 is	 whether	 the	
effects	will	be	applied	retroactively	or	prospectively.	The	practical	relevance	of	this	
matter	is	evident.	If	retaining	the	prospective	effect,	investors	will	benefit	from	the	
relevant	IIA	up	to	the	date	when	the	respondent	State	exercised	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	
right,	and	consequently,	the	arbitral	tribunal	can	effectively	address	any	breach	of	the	
protection	afforded	by	the	IIA	up	to	that	moment.	
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72 As	with	 other	 issues	 concerning	 the	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause,	 this	matter	 is	 also	
highly	debated	in	the	practice	of	arbitral	tribunals.	There	is	no	clear-cut	position	on	
this	issue.	
	
73 In	 Plama	 v.	 Bulgaria,	 the	 arbitral	 tribunal	 explained	 the	 prospective	 effect	 of	 the	
‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	under	Article	17	of	the	ECT	with	reference	to	the	purpose	of	
the	ECT,	as	follows:	
	
In	the	Tribunal’s	view,	therefore,	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	ECT	suggest	that	the	
right’s	exercise	should	not	have	retrospective	effect.	A	putative	investor,	properly	
informed	and	advised	of	the	potential	effect	of	Article	17(1),	could	adjust	its	plans	
accordingly	 prior	 to	making	 its	 investment.	 If,	 however,	 the	 right’s	 exercise	 had	
retrospective	 effect,	 the	 consequences	 for	 the	 investor	 would	 be	 serious.	 The	
investor	could	not	plan	in	the	‘long	term’	for	such	an	effect	(if	at	all);	and	indeed	
such	an	unexercised	right	could	lure	putative	investors	with	legitimate	expectations	
only	 to	 have	 those	 expectations	made	 retrospectively	 false	 at	 a	much	 later	 date	
(Plama	v.	Bulgaria,	2005,	para	162).	
	
74 The	Yukos	arbitral	tribunal	also	decided	in	favour	of	the	prospective	application	of	the	
‘denial	of	benefits’	clause,	with	reference	to	the	purpose	of	the	ECT,	as	follows		
	
In	 any	 event,	 if	 the	 passage	 in	 Respondent’s	 First	 Memorial	 quoted	 above	 in	
paragraph	447	is	construed	as	an	exercise	of	the	reserved	right	of	denial,	it	can	only	
be	 prospective	 in	 effect	 from	 the	 date	 of	 that	 Memorial.	 To	 treat	 denial	 as	
retrospective	would,	in	the	light	of	the	ECT’s	‘Purpose,’	as	set	out	in	Article	2	of	the	
Treaty	(‘The	Treaty	establishes	a	legal	framework	in	order	to	promote	long-term	
cooperation	 in	 the	 energy	 field	 ...’)	 be	 incompatible	 ‘with	 the	 objectives	 and	
principles	 of	 the	 Charter.’	 Paramount	 among	 those	 objectives	 and	 principles	 is	
‘Promotion,	Protection	and	Treatment	of	Investments’	as	specified	by	the	terms	of	
Article	10	of	 the	Treaty.	Retrospective	application	of	a	denial	of	 rights	would	be	
inconsistent	with	such	promotion	and	protection	and	constitute	treatment	at	odds	
with	those	terms	(Yukos	v.	Russian	Federation,	2009	para	458).	
	
75 The	tribunal	in	Liman	Caspian	Oil	v.	Kazakhstan	retained	the	prospective	effect	of	the	
‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	and	further	explained	that	
	
Accepting	the	option	of	a	retroactive	notification	would	not	be	compatible	with	the	
object	 and	 purpose	 of	 the	 ECT,	 which	 the	 Tribunal	 has	 to	 take	 into	 account	
according	to	Article	31(1)	of	the	VCLT,	and	which	the	ECT,	in	its	Article	2,	expressly	
identifies	as	‘to	promote	long-term	co-operation	in	the	energy	field’.	Such	long-term	
co-operation	requires,	and	it	also	follows	from	the	principle	of	legal	certainty,	that	
an	investor	must	be	able	to	rely	on	the	advantages	under	the	ECT,	as	long	as	the	host	
state	has	not	explicitly	invoked	the	right	to	deny	such	advantages.	Therefore,	the	
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Tribunal	finds	that	Article	17(1)	of	the	ECT	does	not	have	retroactive	effect	(Liman	
Caspian	Oil	v.	Kazakhstan,	2010,	para	225).	
	
76 More	recently,	in	the	context	of	the	ECT,	the	tribunal	in	Masdar	v.	Spain	confirmed	the	
finding	 of	 previous	 arbitral	 tribunals	 on	 the	 prospective	 effect	 of	 the	 ‘denial	 of	
benefits’	provision	under	Article	17	of	the	ECT:	
	
A	 majority	 of	 the	 Tribunal	 accepts	 that	 submission.	 It	 considers	 that	 it	 would	
contradict	the	text	and	the	purposes	of	the	ECT	to	say	that	a	Contracting	State	may	
deny	benefits	retrospectively,	after	an	investment	has	been	made	and	a	dispute	has	
arisen.	 That	 would	 be	 contrary	 to	 the	 transparency,	 co-operation	 and	 stability	
objectives	of	the	ECT	and	it	would	lead	to	anomalous	results.	The	majority	notes	
that	 a	majority	of	 tribunals,	which	has	 considered	 this	 issue,	has	 concluded	 that	
before	disputes	arise,	a	Contracting	State	must	act,	whether	by	adopting	legislation	
denying	benefits	generally	(or	to	a	specific	sector	or	sectors)	or	by	promulgating	
measures	directed	at	specific	investors.	That	is	both	practical	and	consistent	with	
the	object	and	purpose	of	the	ECT	–co-operation,	transparency	and	predictability	
(Masdar	v.	Spain,	2018	para	239).	
	
77 In	Ulysseas	v.	Ecuador,	the	arbitral	tribunal	preferred	to	give	effect	to	the	retrospective	
application	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause.	In	reaching	this	decision,	the	arbitrators	
held	that	
	
In	reply	to	Claimant’s	argument	that	this	would	cause	uncertainties	as	to	the	legal	
relations	under	the	BIT,	it	may	be	noted	that	since	the	possibility	for	the	host	State	
to	exercise	the	right	in	question	is	known	to	the	investor	from	the	time	when	it	made	
its	the	[sic]	investment,	it	may	be	concluded	that	the	protection	afforded	by	the	BIT	
is	subject	during	the	life	of	the	investment	to	the	possibility	of	a	denial	of	the	BIT’s	
advantages	by	the	host	State	(Ulysseas	v.	Ecuador,	2010,	para	173).	
	
78 Similarly,	in	Guaracachi	v.	Bolivia,	the	arbitral	tribunal	upheld	the	retroactive	effect,	
concluding	that	the	very	purpose	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	is	to	withdraw	the	
benefits	claimed	by	the	putative	investor:	
	
The	same	must	be	said	in	relation	to	the	supposedly	retroactive	application	of	the	
clause.	 The	 Tribunal	 cannot	 agree	with	 the	 Claimants	when	 they	 argue	 that	 the	
Respondent	is	precluded	from	applying	the	denial	of	benefits	clause	retroactively.	
The	very	purpose	of	the	denial	of	benefits	is	to	give	the	Respondent	the	possibility	
of	withdrawing	the	benefits	granted	under	the	BIT	to	investors	who	invoke	those	
benefits.	As	 such,	 it	 is	proper	 that	 the	denial	 is	 ‘activated’	when	 the	benefits	are	
being	claimed	(Guaracachi	v.	Bolivia,	2014,	para	376).	
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79 It	 appears	 that	 arbitral	 tribunals	 constituted	 under	 the	 ECT	 give	 full	 effect	 to	 the	
prospective	 application	 of	 the	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause	 under	 Article	 17,	 while	
tribunals	 under	 other	 IIAs,	 in	 particular	 under	 US	 BITs	 and	 CAFTA-DR	 favour	 a	
retrospective	effect	(Gastrell	and	Le	Cannu,	2015,	84-5).	
	
80 As	suggested,	one	explanation	for	this	divergent	approach	could	rest	on	the	specific	
language	of	the	relevant	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause.	For	instance,	Article	17	of	the	ECT	
states	that	‘[e]ach	Contracting	Party	reserves	the	right	to	deny	the	advantages	of	this	
Part’,	while	Article	10.12	of	CAFTA-DR	states	that	‘[a]	Party	may	deny	the	benefits	of	
this	Chapter’.	Arguably,	it	is	considered	that	the	effect	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	under	
CAFTA	 can	 only	 be	 upheld	 if	 a	 retrospective	 effect	 is	 attached	 to	 this	 provision	
(Behlman,	 2014,	 417).	 The	 retroactive	 or	 prospective	 application	 of	 a	 ‘denial	 of	
benefits’	clause,	should	indeed	rest	on	the	specific	language	of	the	provision.	However,	
it	 is	 not	 evident	 that	 the	 two	 examples	 above	 would,	 indeed,	 justify	 a	 divergent	
approach.	In	both	cases,	host	States	have	a	discretionary	right	in	deciding	to	deny	the	
benefits	 of	 the	 applicable	 treaty.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 appears	 that	majority	 of	 arbitral	
tribunals	justify	a	prospective	or	retrospective	effect	of	a	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	by	
relying	on	the	object	and	purpose	of	applicable	IIA.	For	example,	Article	2	of	the	ECT	
refers	to	the	purpose	of	the	ECT	as	‘establishing	a	legal	framework	in	order	to	promote	
long-term	cooperation	 in	the	energy	field,	based	on	complementarities	and	mutual	
benefits’	 or	 the	 Preamble	 of	 CAFTA-DR	 referring	 to	 ‘a	 predictable	 commercial	
framework	 for	business	planning	and	 investment’.	 In	 this	respect,	one	could	argue	
how	both	prospective	 and	 retrospective	 effects	 could	be	upheld	by	parties.	At	 the	
same	 time	 investors	 should	 be	 provided	 with	 a	 predictable	 framework	 for	 their	
investments,	the	host	State	should	be	under	the	obligation	to	protect	only	investors	
and	their	investments	that	comply	with	the	prerequisites	set	forth	in	the	applicable	
IIA	(Mistelis	and	Baltag,	2009,	1321).	
	
81 Arbitral	tribunals	should	first	give	preference	to	the	‘ordinary	meaning	to	be	given	to	
the	terms	of	the	treaty	in	their	context	and	in	the	light	of	its	object	and	purpose’,	as	
directed	by	Article	31	of	the	Vienna	Convention	on	the	Law	of	Treaties.	One	could	also	
give	 full	 effect	 to	 the	 reciprocal	 nature	 of	 IIAs,	 as	well	 as	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 legal	
certainty,	 as	 explained	 by	 the	 tribunal	 in	 Liman	 Caspian	 Oil	 v.	 Kazakhstan,	 which	
would	imply	that	‘an	investor	must	be	able	to	rely	on	the	advantages	under	the	ECT,	
as	long	as	the	host	state	has	not	explicitly	invoked	the	right	to	deny	such	advantages’	
(Liman	 Caspian	 Oil	 v.	 Kazakhstan,	 2010,	 para	 225).	 Furthermore,	 such	 approach	
would	be	backed	by	the	legitimate	expectations	investors	have	to	be	protected	as	long	
as	host	States	do	not	decide	to	rely	on	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	right,	especially	when	
such	 prerogative	 is	 a	 possibility,	 as	 evidence	 by	 the	 use	 of	 the	 terms	 ‘may’	 or	
‘reserves’,	rather	than	a	certainty.	
	
	
e.	Burden	of	Proof	
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82 Arbitral	tribunals	are	unanimous	in	concluding	that	the	burden	to	prove	the	fulfilment	
of	the	requirements	for	the	application	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	rests	on	the	
denying	State.		
	
83 In	AMTO	v.	Ukraine,	the	tribunal	explained	that	
	
The	burden	of	proof	of	an	allegation	in	international	arbitration	rests	on	the	party	
advancing	 the	 allegation,	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 maxim	 onus	 probandi	 actori	
incumbit.	In	application	of	this	principle,	a	claimant	has	the	burden	to	prove	that	it	
satisfies	the	definition	of	an	Investor	so	as	to	be	entitled	to	the	Part	III	protections	
and	 the	right	 to	arbitrate	disputes	 in	Article	26.	On	 the	same	basis,	 the	claimant	
would	be	expected	to	have	the	burden	of	proof	that	it	controls,	directly	or	indirectly,	
an	Investment	for	which	protection	is	sought,	and	this	is	a	fact	explicitly	stated	in	
Understanding	 3	 to	 the	 Final	 Act.	 However,	when	 a	 respondent	 alleges	 that	 the	
claimant	is	of	the	class	of	Investors	only	entitled	to	defeasible	protection,	so	that	the	
respondent	 can	 exercise	 its	 power	 to	 deny,	 then	 the	 burden	 passes	 to	 the	
respondent	to	prove	the	factual	prerequisites	of	Article	17	on	which	it	relies.	Article	
17(2)	 adopts	 exactly	 this	 approach	 but,	 as	 already	 mentioned,	 Article	 17(1)	 is	
neutral	on	the	question	of	burden	of	proof	(AMTO	v.	Ukraine,	2008	para	64).	
	
84 Similarly,	in	Generation	Ukraine	v.	Ukraine,	the	arbitral	tribunal	concluded	that		
	
the	 burden	 of	 proof	 to	 establish	 the	 factual	 basis	 of	 the	 ‘third	 country	 control’,	
together	with	the	other	conditions,	 falls	upon	the	State	as	the	party	 invoking	the	
‘right	to	deny’	conferred	by	Article	1(2)	(Generation	Ukraine	v.	Ukraine,	2003,	para	
15.7).	
	
85 In	Pac	Rim	v.	El	Salvador,	the	conclusion	of	the	tribunal	also	indicates	that	respondent	
has	the	burden	to	establish	the	fulfilment	of	the	conditions	for	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	
clause:	
	
The	Tribunal	approaches	this	 issue	as	 to	denial	of	benefits	on	the	basis	 that	 it	 is	
primarily	 for	 the	 Respondent	 to	 establish,	 both	 as	 to	 law	 and	 fact,	 its	 positive	
assertion	 that	 the	 Respondent	 has	 effectively	 denied	 all	 relevant	 benefits	 under	
CAFTA	to	the	Claimant	pursuant	to	CAFTA	Article	10.12.2	and	that,	conversely,	it	is	
not	primarily	for	the	Claimant	here	to	establish	the	opposite	as	a	negative	(Pac	Rim	
v.	El	Salvador,	2012		para	4.60).	
	
86 The	same	approach	was	 followed	by	 the	 tribunal	 in	Ulysseas	v.	Ecuador,	under	 the	
UNCITRAL	Arbitration	Rules:	
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The	Tribunal	agrees	with	Claimant	that	the	burden	of	proving	that	the	conditions	
for	the	exercise	of	the	right	to	deny	the	BIT	advantages	is	to	be	borne	by	Respondent	
as	the	party	advancing	this	specific	defence	to	the	Tribunal’s	jurisdiction.	This	is	the	
rule	 dictated	 by	 the	 UNCITRAL	 Rules	 governing	 these	 proceedings	 (Ulysseas	 v.	
Ecuador,	2010,	para	166).	
	
87 Hence,	the	burden	of	proof	appears	to	be	uncontroversial:	it	rests	with	the	denying	
party,	the	respondent.		
	
	
2.	Substantive	Requirements	
	
88 While	the	language	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	is	not	identical	in	the	IIAs,	they	do	
refer	to	at	least	two	cumulative	conditions	for	such	clause	to	be	called	in	effect:	(1)	
ownership	or	control	of	the	legal	entity	by	nationals	of	a	third	State	or	by	the	denying	
State	(see,	Georgia-Switzerland	BIT	(2014),	Article	8),	and	(2)	the	legal	entity	has	no	
substantial	 business	 activities	 at	 the	 place	 of	 incorporation.	 We	 are	 thus	 in	 the	
scenario	in	which	the	legal	entity	formally	satisfies	the	requirements	of	the	definition	
of	 ‘investor’	 under	 the	 applicable	 IIA,	 usually	 with	 reference	 only	 to	 the	 place	 of	
incorporation	or	seat	being	in	one	of	the	contracting	parties	to	the	IIA.		
	
89 The	cumulative	application	of	the	two	substantive	conditions	mentioned	above	is	not	
controversial	in	practice.	For	example,	in	Plama	v.	Bulgaria,	the	arbitral	tribunal	was	
clear	in	concluding	that	the	wording	of	Article	17	of	the	ECT	poses	no	difficulties	in	
this	respect:	
	
Article	 17	 is	 entitled	 ‘Non-Application	 of	 Part	 III	 in	 Certain	 Circumstances’;	 and	
taken	 from	 the	 ECT’s	 English	 version,	 Article	 17(1)	 provides:	 ‘Each	 Contracting	
Party	reserves	the	right	to	deny	the	advantages	of	this	Part	[i.e.,	Part	III]	to:	(1)	a	
legal	entity	[Limb	i]	if	citizens	or	nationals	of	a	third	state	own	or	control	such	entity	
and	[Limb	ii]	if	that	entity	has	no	substantial	business	activities	in	the	Area	of	the	
Contracting	Party	in	which	it	is	organised;	...’.	The	Tribunal	attaches	significance	to	
the	word	 ‘and’	 linking	 both	 limbs	 of	 Article	 17(1),	 thereby	 requiring	 both	 to	 be	
satisfied	(Plama	v.	Bulgaria,	2005	para	143).	
	
90 Likewise,	in	the	Yukos	cases,	the	tribunal	held	that	
	
It	 is	 apparent	 from	 the	wording	 of	 Article	 17(1)	 that	 two	 additional	 cumulative	
substantive	 conditions	must	 be	met	 before	 the	 ‘denial-of-benefits’	 clause	 can	 be	
exercised	in	respect	of	any	particular	legal	entity.	First,	such	legal	entity	must	be	
owned	or	controlled	by	citizens	or	nationals	of	a	third	State;	second,	the	legal	entity	
must	have	no	substantial	business	activities	 in	 the	place	 in	which	 it	 is	organized	
(Yukos	v.	Russian	Federation,	2009,	para	460).	
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91 In	Ulysseas	v.	Ecuador,	the	tribunal	applied	the	rules	of	treaty	interpretation	and	held	
that	
	
…	two	cumulative	conditions	must	be	met	for	Respondent	to	deny	Claimant	the	[US-
Ecuador]	BIT	advantages:		
a)	Claimant	must	be	controlled	by	third	party	nationals,	and		
b)	either	Claimant	does	not	 conduct	 substantial	business	activities	 in	 the	United	
States	 or	 Claimant	 is	 controlled	 by	 nationals	 of	 a	 third	 country	 with	 which	
Respondent	does	not	maintain	normal	economic	relations.		
The	Parties	agree	that	 these	are	the	relevant	conditions	under	Article	 I(2)	of	 the	
[US-Ecuador]	 BIT	 and	 that	 they	must	 be	met	 cumulatively	 (Ulysseas	 v.	 Ecuador,	
2010,	para	167).		
	
92 With	 respect	 to	 the	 substantive	 requirements	 for	 the	 application	 of	 the	 ‘denial	 of	
benefits’	clause,	arbitral	tribunals	have	signalled	the	scarce	guidance	when	it	comes	
to	 the	meaning	of	 the	notions	of	 ‘substantive	activities’,	 ‘control’	and	 ‘third	State	/	
party’.	Few	IIAs	include	a	definition	of	these	notion.	Some	treaties	attempt	to	define	
some	of	these	terms.	For	example,	Article	14.17	of	the	Japan-Australia	BIT	defines	the	
notions	of	‘ownership’	and	‘control’	in	the	context	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause.	The	
notion	of	‘control’	is	also	mentioned	in	Understandings	no.	3	to	Article	1(6)	of	the	ECT,	
in	the	context	of	the	definition	of	the	notion	of	‘investment’	(→	Protected	investment).	
As	explained	there,	
	
…	control	of	an	Investment	means	control	in	fact,	determined	after	an	examination	
of	the	actual	circumstances	in	each	situation.	In	any	such	examination,	all	relevant	
factors	should	be	considered,	including	the	Investor’s	
(a)	financial	interest,	including	equity	interest,	in	the	Investment;	
(b)	ability	to	exercise	substantial	influence	over	the	management	and	operation	of	
the	Investment;	and	
(c)	 ability	 to	exercise	 substantial	 influence	over	 the	 selection	of	members	of	 the	
board	of	directors	or	any	other	managing	body.	
Where	there	is	doubt	as	to	whether	an	Investor	controls,	directly	or	indirectly,	an	
Investment,	 an	 Investor	 claiming	such	control	has	 the	burden	of	proof	 that	 such	
control	exists.	
	
93 The	Protocol	of	23	August	1995	to	the	Australia-Argentina	BIT,	entered	into	force	on	
11	January	1997,	refers	to	the	following	elements	of	‘control’:	
	
1.	The	Contracting	Parties	acknowledge	that	the	question	of	control	with	respect	to	
an	investor	will	depend	on	the	factual	circumstances	of	the	particular	case.		
2.	The	Contracting	Party	in	whose	territory	the	investments	are	undertaken	may	
require	proof	of	the	control	invoked	by	the	investors	of	the	other	Contracting	Party.		
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3.	The	following	facts,	inter	alia,	shall	be	accepted	as	evidence	of	control:		
(a)	a	level	of	direct	or	indirect	participation	in	the	capital	of	a	legal	person	or	of	a	
company	which	allows	for	control,	such	as	a	direct	or	indirect	participation	higher	
than	50%	of	the	capital	or	a	majority	shareholding;	or		
(b)	a	direct	or	indirect	control	of	the	voting	rights	allowing	for:		
(i)	the	exercise	of	a	decisive	power	over	management	and	operations;	or		
(ii)	 the	 exercise	 of	 a	 decisive	 power	 over	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 Board	 of	
Directors	or	any	other	managing	body.	
4.	Where	there	is	doubt	as	to	whether	an	investor	exercises	effective	control,	the	
investor	shall	be	responsible	for	demonstrating	that	such	control	exists.		
	
94 Supporting	provisions	are	also	found	in	the	North	American	Free	Trade	Agreement	
Implementation	 Act	 Statement	 of	 Administrative	 Action	 of	 November	 1993,	
submitted	 to	 the	 US	 Congress	 and	 containing	 the	 actions	 proposed	 to	 implement	
NAFTA,	as	follows:	
	
Thus	 shell	 companies	 could	 be	 denied	 benefits	 but	 not,	 for	 example,	 firms	 that	
maintain	their	central	administration	or	principal	place	of	business	in	the	territory	
of,	or	have	a	real	and	continuous	link	with,	the	country	where	they	are	established.	
This	provision	requires	the	denying	government	to	give	prior	notification,	and	to	
consult,	in	accordance	with	Articles	1803	and	2006.	
	
95 With	 respect	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘control’,	 the	 tribunal	 in	 Ulysseas	 v.	 Ecuador	 first	
highlighted	that	while	‘[t]he	Parties	agree	also	that	the	term	“control”	means	the	“legal	
capacity	 to	 control”,	 they	 “disagree	 regarding	 whether	 control	 must	 be	 exercised	
“directly,”	 as	 argued	 by	 Claimant,	 or	may	 be	 exercised	 “indirectly,”	 as	 asserted	 by	
Respondent’	 (Ulysseas	 v.	 Ecuador,	 2010,	 para	 168).	 As	 such,	 the	 tribunal	 had	 to	
‘determine	whether	the	terms	of	Article	I(2)	of	the	[US-Ecuador]	BIT,	when	read	in	
their	context	and	in	the	light	of	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	treaty,	are	meant	to	limit	
“control”	to	direct	control	or	also	embrace	indirect	control’	(Ulysseas	v.	Ecuador,	2010,	
para	169).	The	tribunal	was	comfortable	in	deciding	that	it	would	look	into	the	upper	
end	of	the	chain	of	control	of	a	company	(Ulysseas	v.	Ecuador,	2010,	paras	170-171).	
Establishing	who		in	fact	controls	a	legal	entity	is	not	a	straightforward	task.	Frequent	
changes	in	the	corporate	structure,	few	or	no	restrictions	on	the	transfer	of	shares,	
non-public	 shareholders’	 registers	 etc.	 are	 some	 of	 the	 difficulties	 created	 by	 the	
control-test	established	under	 the	 ‘denial	of	benefits’	 clause.	 It	has	been	suggested	
that	 ‘effective	 control	 as	 opposed	 to	 legal	 control	 is	 a	 more	 probing	 test	 for	 the	
claimant	 and	 enables	 tribunals	 to	 look	more	 easily	 for	 the	 ‘true’	 controller	 of	 the	
investment’.	(Baumgartner,	257)	
	
	
96 As	to	the	meaning	of	the	terms	‘substantial	activity’,	the	arbitral	tribunal	in	AMTO	v.	
Ukraine,	concluded	that,	in	the	absence	of	a	definition	in	the	ECT,	
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…	'substantial'	in	this	context	means	'of	substance,	and	not	merely	of	form'.	It	does	
not	mean	'large',	and	the	materiality	not	the	magnitude	of	the	business	activity	is	
the	decisive	question.	In	the	present	case,	the	Tribunal	is	satisfied	that	the	Claimant	
has	 substantial	business	 activity	 in	Latvia,	 on	 the	basis	of	 its	 investment	 related	
activities	conducted	 from	premises	 in	Latvia,	and	 involving	 the	employment	of	a	
small	but	permanent	staff	(AMTO	v.	Ukraine,	2008,	para	69).	
	
97 Subsequent	arbitral	tribunal	followed	the	approach	of	the	tribunal	in	AMTO	v.	Ukraine	
on	 the	 issue	of	 ‘substantial	 business	 activity’.	 For	 example,	 in	Masdar	 v.	 Spain,	 the	
tribunal	concluded	the	following:	
	
There	 is	 no	 definition	 in	 the	 ECT	 itself	 of	 ‘substantial	 business	 activities.’	 The	
Tribunal	has	had	regard,	however,	to	the	decision	of	the	tribunal	in	AMTO	in	which	
it	 concluded	 that:	 ‘[...]”substantial”	 in	 this	 context	 means	 “of	 substance	 and	 not	
merely	of	form”.	It	does	not	mean	“large”,	and	the	materiality,	not	the	magnitude	of	
the	business	activity	is	the	decisive	question.’	
The	Tribunal	adopts	this	analysis.	It	has	taken	note	of	all	the	reservations	raised	by	
the	 Respondent,	 but	 it	 concludes	 that	 the	 unchallenged	 evidence	 adduced	 by	
Claimant,	 notably	 as	 to	 its	 standing	 as	 a	 holding	 company	 with	 substantial	
international	assets	under	its	control	…	and	the	similarly	unchallenged	evidence	of	
Mr.	 Al	 Ramahi,	 is	 persuasive	 of	 the	 true	 extent	 and	materiality	 of	 the	 business	
conducted	by	Claimant	in	The	Netherlands.	Respondent	has	failed	to	demonstrate	
that	Claimant	has	no	substantial	business	activity	in	The	Netherlands.	Accordingly,	
there	is	no	basis	for	a	denial	of	benefits	under	Article	17(1)	of	the	ECT	(Masdar	v.	
Spain,	2018,	paras	253-4).	
	
98 In	 Pac	 Rim	 v.	 El	 Salvador,	 while	 the	 tribunal	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 group	 of	
companies	 of	which	 the	 putative	 investor	 formed	 a	 part	 had	 ‘substantial	 business	
activities’	 in	 the	 territory	 of	 the	 US,	 it	 held	 that	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 ‘denial	 of	
benefits’	 clause	 under	 CAFTA-DR,	 it	was	 the	 claimant’s	 individual	 activities	which	
would	qualify	the	substantial	business	in	the	territory	of	the	home	State:	
	
However, in the Tribunal’s view, this first condition under CAFTA Article 10.12.2 relates not 
to the collective activities of a group of companies, but to activities attributable to the 
‘enterprise’ itself, here the Claimant. If that enterprise’s own activities do not reach the level 
stipulated by CAFTA Article 10.12.2, it cannot aggregate to itself the separate activities of 
other natural or legal persons to increase the level of its own activities: those would not be 
the enterprise’s activities for the purpose of applying CAFTA Article 10.12.2 (Pac Rim v. El 
Salvador, 2012 para 4.66). 
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99 As	explained,	the	terms	‘substantial	business’	should	imply	that	the	investor	is	not	a	
‘mailbox	company’	or	a	‘shell	company’,	a	legal	entity	which	does	not	have	life	of	its	
own	(Mistelis	and	Baltag,	2009,	1315).	As	such,	one	would	expect	that	the	investor	is	
 
engaged in buying, selling, and contracting in that territory beyond the normal activities or 
functions required merely by the fact of its corporate existence (such as corporate registration 
and administration, including holding requisite board or shareholders’ meetings and the 
payment of associated taxes and corporate registration fees) (Jagusch and Sinclair, 2008, 20). 
 
100 ‘Substantial	business’	would	mean,	 as	 a	minimum,	 that	 the	 investor	 is	party	 to	
transactions	 in	 the	 home	 State,	 has	 employees	 involved	 in	 such	 transactions,	 has	
resident	 managers,	 etc.	 (Jagusch	 and	 Sinclair,	 2008,	 20).	 Usually,	 IIAs,	 and	 in	
particular,	 the	 older	 generation	 of	 IIAs,	 do	 not	 define	 what	 ‘substantial	 activities’	
mean.	One	example	of	a	treaty	that	attempts	to	explain	the	meaning	of	these	terms	is	
the	2018	Dutch	Model	BIT,	which,	in	Article	1(c)	provides	that	
	
Indications	of	having	 ‘substantive	business	activities’	 in	a	Contracting	Party	may	
include:	
(i)	the	undertaking’s	registered	office	and/or	administration	is	established	in	that	
Contracting	Party;	
(ii)	 the	 undertaking’s	 headquarters	 and/or	 management	 is	 established	 in	 that	
Contracting	Party;	
(iii)	 the	 number	 of	 employees	 and	 their	 qualifications	 based	 in	 that	 Contracting	
Party;	
(iv)	the	turnover	generated	in	that	Contracting	Party;	and	
(v)	an	office,	production	facility	and/or	research	laboratory	is	established	in	that	
Contracting	Party;	
These	indications	should	be	assessed	in	each	specific	case,	taking	into	account	the	
total	number	of	employees	and	turnover	of	 the	undertaking	concerned,	and	take	
account	of	the	nature	and	maturity	of	the	activities	carried	out	by	the	undertaking	
in	the	Contracting	Party	in	which	it	is	established	(Dutch	Model	BIT	2018).	
	
101 Similarly,	Articles	1.2.1.	and	1.2.2	of	the	Indian	Model	BIT	refer	to	the	following:	
1.2.1	 For	 greater	 certainty,	 ‘real	 and	 substantial	 business	 operations’	 for	 the	
purposes	of	this	definition	requires	an	Enterprise	to	have,	without	exception,	all	the	
following	elements:		
(i)	made	a	substantial	and	long-term	commitment	of	capital	in	the	Host	State;		
(ii)	engaged	a	substantial	number	of	employees	in	the	territory	of	the	Host	State;		
(iii)	assumed	entrepreneurial	risk;		
(iv)	made	a	substantial	contribution	to	the	development	of	the	Host	State	through	
its	operations	along	with	transfer	of	technological	knowhow,	where	applicable;	and	
(v)	carried	out	all	its	operations	in	accordance	with	the	Law	of	the	Host	State.	
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1.2.2	‘Real	and	substantial	business	operations’	do	not	include:		
(i)	 objectives/strategies/arrangements,	 the	 main	 purpose	 or	 one	 of	 the	 main	
purposes	of	which	is	to	avoid	tax	liabilities;		
(ii)	the	passive	holding	of	stock,	securities,	land,	or	other	property;	or		
(iii)the	 ownership	 or	 leasing	 of	 real	 or	 personal	 property	 used	 in	 a	 trade	 or	
business.	
	
102 It	is	evident	that	factors,	such	as	turnover,	number	of	employees,	facilities	owned	
by	 the	 alleged	 investor	 etc.	 are	 indicative	 elements	 in	 establishing	 a	 substantial	
business	activity.	As	such,	an	arbitral	tribunal,	based	on	the	evidence	presented	to	it,	
must	 engage	 in	 a	 factual	 inquiry	 in	determining	whether	 the	 investor	has,	 indeed,	
substantial	activity	in	its	home	State.	The	key	element	here	is	that	such	determination	
must	be	focused	on	‘substantial’,	rather	than	on	‘any’	business	activity.	Consequently,	
the	threshold	set	by	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	is	high,	but	is	balanced	by	the	other	
prerequisites	of	 the	clause,	 such	as	 the	 ‘control	or	ownership	by	 third	States’.	One	
could	 argue	 that	 the	 approach	 should	 be	 	 qualitative	 rather	 than	 quantitative	 	 as	
dictated	by	the	provisions	of	the	applicable	IIA.	In	this	sense,	the	object	of	assessment	
by	an	arbitral	 tribunal	 is	not	 the	magnitude	of	 the	business	on	 the	 territory	of	 the	
home	State	but	the	genuineness	of	the	business.	Consequently,	in	assessing	the	facts	
of	 the	case,	arbitral	 tribunals,	arguably,	should	be	guided	by	the	elements	 that	can	
detect	whether	the	activities	in	the	home	State	are	real	or	legitimate.	This	approach	
would	be	justified	by	the	purpose	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause,	which	is	to	preserve	
the	reciprocity	in	the	IIAs	and	prevent	abuses	to	their	benefits.	
103 With	 reference	 to	 the	meaning	 of	 ‘third	 State	 /	 party’,	 the	 tribunal	 in	AMTO	 v.	
Ukraine	held	that		
	
…	the	investor	must	be	owned	or	controlled	by	citizens	or	nationals	of	a	'third	state'.	
'Third	state'	is	not	defined	in	the	ЕСТ,	but	is	used	in	Article	1(7)	in	contradistinction	
to	 'Contracting	Party',	which	suggests	 that	a	 third	state	 is	any	state	 that	 is	not	a	
Contracting	Party	to	the	ЕСТ	(para	72).	
	
104 In	Libanaco	v.	Turkey,	the	arbitral	tribunal	devoted	considerable	attention	to	the	
travaux	preparatoires	of	the	ECT	in	the	context	of	the	meaning	of	the	notion	of	‘third	
state’,	which	appears	not	only	in	Article	17	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	but	also	in	
other	provisions	of	the	ECT	including	in	the	definition	of	the	notion	of	‘investor’	under	
Article	1(7).	The	tribunal	highlighted	that,	for	example,	under	Article	7	of	the	ECT,	the	
notion	of	‘third	state’	refers	to	a	Contracting	Party	to	the	ECT	and	concluded	that	in	
the	context	of	Article	17,	the	notion	of	 ‘third	state’	is	meant	to	point	toward	a	non-
Contracting	Party	 to	 the	ECT	(Libanaco	v.	Turkey,	2011,	paras	552-6).	As	such,	 the	
ECT,	 unlike	 other	 IIAs,	 (e.g.	 Australia-Republic	 of	 Korea	 FTA)	 does	 not	 appear	 to	
include	cases	where	the	legal	entity	is	owned	or	controlled	by	nationals	of	the	host	
Contracting	Party	(Jagusch	and	Sinclair,	2008,	19).	
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D.	Outlook		
	
105 There	has	been	a	marked	progression	in	the	increase	of	use	of	‘denial	of	benefits’	
clauses	 in	 recent	 IIAs	and	 in	 the	development	of	 jurisprudence	on	 such	 clauses.	 It	
appears	that	most	new	FTAs	with	an	investment	chapter	contain	a	‘denial	of	benefits’	
clause	and	the	clauses	are	used	as	a	state	defence	to	aggressive	and	speculative	treaty	
shopping	pursued	by	investors.	As	a	result,	the	conditions	for	the	application	of	the	
clause	 are	 both	 control	 from	 a	 third	 state	 party	 and	 lack	 of	 substantive	 business	
activity	in	the	state	of	alleged	nationality.	The	function	of	the	clauses	has	also	evolved	
from	an	attempt	to	merely	deny	tribunals	jurisdiction	to	hear	a	particular	matter	to	
more	 consistently	 denying	 prima	 facie	 investors	 benefits	 of	 IIA	 claims	 where	 the	
conditions	of	 the	 treaty	clause	are	met.	The	burden	of	proof	 clearly	 rests	with	 the	
party	denying	the	benefits,	i.e.	the	respondent	state.	It	is	also	for	the	state	to	rely	on	
the	clause	and	not	a	matter	for	a	tribunal	to	discuss	ex	officio.		
	
106 Over	the	last	decade	various	‘denial	of	benefits’	clauses	have	been	discussed	and	
applied	 by	 tribunals	 with	 some	 matters	 being	 settled	 and	 uncontroversial	 (e.g.	
conditions	 to	be	met	 for	 the	application	of	 clause)	 and	a	 small	number	of	matters	
subject	to	divergent	applications	(in	particular,	the	timing	and	the	timeliness	of	the	
reliance	on	the	clause).		
	
107 ‘Denial	of	benefits’	 clauses	have	gained	significance	as	 states	wish	 to	moderate	
treaty	shopping	and	aggressive	establishment	of	jurisdiction.	It	is,	thus,	expected	that	
tribunals	will	be	addressing	more	such	clauses	in	the	not	too	distant	future.		
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